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In seeking to persuade, an advocate may ask the jury "to violate
all logical rules, and do violence to all the laws of legitimate inference." I
Indeed, "it is never a good ground of exception that an argument is
unsound," 2 at least where counsel's efforts to convince the trier of the
fact are concerned.- With this much as conceded premise,4 it is not
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1. Combs v. State, 75 Ind. 215, 219 (1881).
2. Abuses in Arguments of Counsel, 7 LAw NOTES 126 (1903), relying on It re
McCabe, 70 Vt. 155, 40 Atl. 52 (1898).
3. Compare Combs v. State, 75 Ind. 215, 219 (1881) C"... but we cannot under-
take to correct their [counsels'] logic"), wuith State v. Moore, 32 Ore. 65, 81, 48 Pac.
468, 473 (1897) (". . . if he make a wrong deduction, the court will, upon request
therefor, correct it by giving a proper instruction. .").
4. "Now in this domain of logic, it is conceded, the counsel is free from restraint
during argument. His desired inference may be forced, unnatural and untenable; but
as to this the jury are to judge; that is precisely their function." 6 WIGmORE, EVI-
DENCE § 1807, at 272 (3d ed. 1940). But see Wigmore's conclusion that counsel's argu-
ment is "subject, no doubt, to judicial correction in case of palpable bad faith ... "
Ibid. See also Notes, Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prose-
cution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 946, 954-55 (1954) ; The Permissible
Scope of Summation, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 934 (1936).
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surprising that the rules governing the permissible limits of argumenta-
tion are relatively few and that the administration of what rules there
are has been characterized as "relaxed and careless." 5 Even where
there is sound basis for objecting to an argument, tactical considerations
may dictate acquiescence on the part of the opposing attorney,0 and
the bench is frequently hesitant to intrude its views on propriety during
the course of an advocate's peroration.7 What results is a truly wide
latitude for flights of forensic oratory.
It would, of course, be wrong to assume that counsel can commit
no wrong in his argument or that a trial court is immune from reversible
error in refusing to impose restrictions. Some limits do exist. This
article attempts to explore those which relate to the advocate who
asserts or assumes facts not in evidence, either during a review of the
testimony or in the process of urging a particular evaluation of it.
Proof and persuasion are two basic components of the process we
know as the trial of an issue of fact. The former is accomplished by
adducing evidence; the latter by arguing the effect which should be
accorded that which has already been introduced. Both are important.'
For a trial court to deny the right of argument, or even to imply that
a jury "should receive no impressions" from counsel's attempts at
persuasion has been held reversible error.' Yet, with some notable
exceptions to be considered subsequently, the judicial attitude of len-
iency which characterizes the permissible range of the advocate's
perorations stands in sharp contrast to the attitudes which have marked
the development of our complex pattern of exclusionary rules.1" In
5. Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: II, 34 CoLum. L. REv. 1462,
1485 n.21 (1934).
6. See Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 522 (1851) ("...what practitioner has not
regretted his untoward interference, when the counsel thus interrupted, resumes, 'yes,
gentlemen, I have touched a tender spot, the galled jade will wince; you see where the
shoe pinches'"). See also People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 834 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1952). In addition to the possibility that counsel may only succeed in emphasizing the
argument to the jury by objecting to it, Wigmore emphasizes the possibility that other
counsel will pick up tricks of argument from appellate opinions which must decide
their propriety. 6 WioaoE, EVIDXNC4 § 1806 n.1, 266 (3d ed. 1940). See also
Britton v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 118 Mich. 491, 76 N.W. 1043 (1898) (interruption
of argument of counsel forbidden by trial court) ; 1 THoMPsoN, TRIALS § 957 (2d ed.
1912). But see Pierson v. State, 18 Tex. App. 524, 564 (1885).
7. See Sullivan v. State, 66 Ala. 48 (1880) ; State v. Moore, 32 Ore. 65, 81, 48
Pac. 468, 473 (1897). But cf. discussion of the duty of the presiding judge to check
improper argument on his own motion in 1 THompsoN, TRIALS § 958 (2d ed. 1912).
8. "The resolution of an issue of fact requires inferences as well as testimonial
and real proof. In order to bring the inferences to the attention of the jury, counsel
must present them in argument." Note, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 946, 954 (1954). See also
Michael & Adler, supra note 5, at 1480.
9. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alterovitz, 214 Ind. 186, 205, 14 N.E.2d 570,
578 (1938).
10. For an interesting exploration of the relationship between the ridigity of
evidence doctrines and misconduct of counsel in argument, see Abuses in Arguments
of Counsel, 7 LAw Nomzs 126 (1903): "It is also well known that the common law
PERSUADING THE JURY
the latter area excessively rigorous standards of admissibility have long
given rise to dissatisfaction."1 Even now, the call of the commentators
for some measure of relaxation cannot be said to be meeting with over-
whelming success.'
It is precisely this stringency in testing admissibility, with its
resultant mass of "evidence" law,'" which may prove an important
factor in re-examining the role of persuasion. The "lush exuberance
of doctrines which bloom in the digests" 14 and in the multi-volumed
treatises have lent force to current efforts at reform by simplification.
Certainly as regards those exclusionary rules intended to protect the
trier of the fact from evidence likely to be unworthy because of error-
potential, the contemporary cry, emerging as a recurrent theme, is for
admissibility "for whatever weight" the evidence may have.' We
are content to protect our juries less from the effects of that which
has little force ' and to rely more on their ability to discriminate and
evaluate.
If we are to put a new and heavy emphasis on the ability of the
trier of the fact to weigh the evidence, it is appropriate to inquire
concerning the tools at his disposal. More often assumed than articu-
lated is the premise that jurors must rely on common sense, or the
knowledge and experience which they share with the community
generallyY But "common sense is frequently wrong. . . . Our
every day experience of the world comes in crude, unrepresentative
chunks, with causal relations hopelessly obscured, and with prejudice,
superstition, and self-interest inextricably intertwined in perception." 18
for various reasons, historical or practical, excludes many items of evidence that in
every-day life would be extremely persuasive and are in fact admitted in courts of
other highly civilized nations; and it is difficult for counsel to submit to a rule which
bars out testimony that our own courts freely concede to be of great weight every-
where except in the judicial tribunals of England and America."
11. See, e.g., Clark, Foreword, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
10 RuTmas L. Rxv. 479 (1956); Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1954);
MNforgan, Introduction to Symposium, Minnesota and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
40 MiNN. L. Riv. 297 (1956).
12. See id. at 297.
13. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. R]V. 277
(1952).
14. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 508 (1938).
15. See Cleary, supra note 13, at 279; MORGAN, THaE LAw OF EVIDENcE-SOME
PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORS 24-25 (1927) (quoting from the second report of the
English Common Law Practice Commissioners, 1853).
16. Of course, some of the force in the attempts to simplify evidence rules
probably results from glaring inconsistencies: "The exclusionary rules, as a whole,
are a conglomeration of inconsistencies which prevent jurors from hearing highly
relevant, credible evidence while permitting them to hear and consider evidence of
slight weight and doubtful credibility." Morgan, Introduction to Symposium, Min-
nesota and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 40 MINN. L. REv. 297 (1956).
17. See MCCORMICK, EvM4NCS 691 (1954).
18. Bitterman, The Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in Ltvix, Evi-
DN AND Tis B HAvIoRAL ScScZ~s A-16 (mimeo. 1956).
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This is no argument for not using common sense. We operate judicial
institutions with the best we have and under the inescapable necessity
of making concessions to the shortness of life. The point is, however,
that today the proper evaluation of evidence can often be aided by
techniques more refined and more compelling than utilization of "jury
knowledge" without more. Significant experimentation on the prob-
lems of identification of faces, of voices, of handwriting has taken place
in recent years 19 and a great deal more is projected." May these be
used by the advocate in argumentation and, if so, under what condi-
tions? Counsel may suggest to a jury that eyewitnesses who make
positive identification can still be mistaken. May he also tell them
that the median test score in a recent experiment showed close to
forty per cent error in recognizing faces-over half the subjects wrong
in more than one third of their identifications? 2" He can discuss the
fact that memory fades with time. Can he state that science has shown
that people forget close to three quarters of what they learned two
days previous, if the basis for the statement is an experiment with non-
sense syllables and the litigation concerns the details of an auto ac-
cident? 22 We shall attempt to explore these and similar questions.
New and constantly increasing scientific data ranging from the problems
of suggestibility and perception through those of memory, combined
with an increased emphasis on the evaluation of evidence admitted
under new and more liberal rules of admissibility, warrant increased
concern with the permissible limits of persuasion.' The legal rules
governing forensic oratory have been virtually neglected 2 4 as bench,
19. See, e.g., Belbin & Cane, Some Factors Affecting Response in Recognition
Tests, 8 QJ. ExPR. PsycH. 45 (1956), Howells, A Study of Ability To Recognize
Faces, 33 J. AB. & Soc. PsYcH. 124 (1938); McGehee, The Reliability of the Identi-
fication of the Human Voice, 17 J. G N. PSYCH. 249 (1937); Inbau, Lay Witnress
Identification of Handwriting (An Experiment), 34 Irm. L. RXv. 433 (1939); Tresselt,
A Study of the Factors in the Identification of Handwriting, 24 J. Soc. PsYcH. 101
(1946).
20. See LZVIN, EVIXNC" AND THr BWHAVIORAL SciZNC s B-401, E-28 (mimeo.
1956). These materials were prepared with the participation of the following con-
sultants from the Behavioral Sciences: Andrew S. Watson, M.D. (Co-Director of
the broader project of which evidence is one phase), M. E. Bitterman, Ph.D., Richard
G. Lonsdorf, M.D., Julius Wishner, Ph.D., Marvin E. Wolfgang, Ph.D.
21. See Howells, supra note 19.
22. Cf. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
Memory, 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 860, 866 (1928).
23. But cf. Cleary, supra note 13, at 280: "Effective control of the decision-
making process seems likely to be accomplished only in terms of rules-of exclusion, and
the integrity of the process demands that the rules be defensible."
24. See id. at 294: "Any account of the stimuli to which trier is exposed would be
patently incomplete in the absence of at least passing reference to the final arguments
of counsel. .... They lie outside the conventional scope of the subject of evidence, and
hence beyond the confines of this discussion." This bias has been reflected in the little
attention paid to the subject by McCormick. See McCoIulCK, EVIDXNce 691 (1954).
Wigmore, however, has a fairly complete discussion, replete with illustration, of one
phase of the problem. 6 WieoPz, EvIDENc9 §§ 1806-07 (3d ed. 1940). Occasional
analyses have been available, but these have largely concerned themselves only with
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bar and legal commentators put heavy emphasis on problems of ad-
missibility. Today, however, increased interest in argumentation on
the part of some courts has already been demonstratedY This is an
interest which is likely to spread.
A DMITTEDLY IMPROPER ARGUMENT: THE PRIMARY CATEGORIES
Any inquiry concerned with limitations on the right of the advocate
to argue must deal 26 with a category of case in which the freedom of
the advocate has been substantially, if not evenly, limited by all courts.
That category has been mildly labeled "unfair comment." 27 Reading
from an article entitled "Only a Boy Peddler," an account of the death
of "a little fellow" who sold "collar buttons and pocket combs from a
modest tray, to help support his mother and eight brothers and sisters
S .,, 28 which account has absolutely no relationship to the case
being litigated except to inflame the juries against corporations gener-
ally, has been held not to be permitted.2' As the North Carolina court
has so aptly put it, after reviewing some of the cases: "These illustra-
tions of unfair comment, beginning with the familiar 'poor widow and
rich corporation' argument, running through the 'Pennsylvania Yankee'
appeal, including the famous upas tree declaration 0 and ending with
the problem of prejudicial comment, or such topics as the failure of the accused to
testify, counsel's opinion of the guilt of the accused, local or sectional bias. See, e.g.,
Bruce, The Right To Comment Upon the Failure of the Defendant To Testify, 31
MICH. L. REv. 226 (1933); Notes, 63 CENT. L.J. 398 (1906); 33 HARv. L. Rav. 956
(1920); 42 J. CI. L., C. & P.S. 73 (1951). Additionally, commentators on trial
practice and tactics have paid some casual attention to the topic. See, e.g., CuTia,
STjccssvua TmA. TAcTICs 189-91 (1949); KEToN, TRIAL TAcTIcs AND METHODS
261-65 (1954). The most complete, albeit dated, treatment of the law of argument
may be found in 1 THomPsoN, TRIALS §§ 940-1010 (2d ed. 1912).
25. See State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 144, 98 A.2d 295, 298 (1953) : "The opening
and closing statements of all counsel in every jury case are integral and important
parts of the trial proceeding. It is not presently required that they be recorded
stenographically. The court is of the opinion that wholesome results may be realized
from such a requirement, and we are therefore including in the forthcoming
Revision of the Rules Governing the Courts appropriate rules requiring that in all
causes, civil or criminal, tried before a jury. . .the opening and closing statements of
all counsel to the jury shall be taken stenographically in open court."
26. The appeal to prejudice which this rule proscribes, while an independent basis
of objection, is often considered by the court in conjunction with other problems and
articulated to buttress a decision made upon other grounds. See, e.g., People v.
Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
27. Conn v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 201 N.C. 157, 160, 159 S.E. 331, 333 (1931).
The opinion gives eight classes of restrictions which counsel may not violate in argu-
ment.
28. Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated R.R., 126 N.Y. 96, 102, 26 N.E. 1048, 1049
(1891).
29. Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated R.R., supra note 28.
30. Coble v. Coble, 79 N.C. 589, 591 (1878) (". . .he [the defendant] was like
the upas tree, shedding pestilence and corruption all around him. . ."). See also
McDonald v. People, 126 Ill. 150, 155, 18 N.E. 817, 819 (1888) (Reversible error
for counsel to say of defendant's brother: "They say there is a fabled tree that
grows in some torrid clime; that the birds of the air which fly near its branches,
influenced by the aroma of it, fall beneath it and die. That is the influence of Ml. C.
McDonald in this and all matters connected with the administration of justice.").
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the religious and social theories referred to in the Beal case, all stand
as a lasting monument to vituperative ingenuity." 31
We need not pause here to attempt to define the limits of the
prejudicial appeal.32 Suffice it to note that there is considerable latitude
even in the area of allegedly inflammatory remarks. A more accurate
reflection of the law in action may be found in the comment of Weaver,
J. who, finding utility in declamations which relieve the tedium of the
jury,' observed:
"The sorrowing, 'gray-haired parents,' upon the one hand, and the
broken-hearted 'victim of man's duplicity,' upon the other, have
adorned the climax and peroration of legal oratory from a time
'whence the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,' and
for us at this late day to brand their use as misconduct would
expose us to just censure for interference with ancient land-
marks." 14
A second category of admitted impropriety is the attempt of counsel
to establish, not by proof but by his own assertions during the course of
argument, material facts concerning which the record is silent. Stating
to the jury that a hat bearing defendant's initials was discovered near
the scene of the homicide charged, no evidence of this having been
introduced, is obviously improper, 5 and the litigated cases include
such extreme examples as quoting assertions of guilt made by non-
witnesses.3 It requires no great devotion to the spirit of the exclu-
31. Conn v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 201 N.C. 157, 160, 159 S.E. 331, 333 (1931).
32. See Annots., 78 A.L.R. 1438 (1932) ; 1918D L.R.A. (n.s.) 4; Notes, 54 CoLUM.
L. Rzv. 946 (1954) ; 36 CoLum. L. REv. 931 (1936) ; 42 J. Cint. L., C. & P.S. 73
(1951).
33. For another expression of this policy, see Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d
941, 943 (9th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946): "It is our
opinion that if the conduct of the prosecution in argument in this case constitutes
error, then, the prosecution in every case is limited to a listless, vigorless summation
of fact in Chesterfieldian politeness. Gone are the days of the great advocates whose
logic glowed and flowed with the heat of forensics I"
34. State v. Burns, 119 Iowa 663, 671, 94 N.W. 238, 241 (1903).
35. The example is taken from Wigmore who maintains it would be improper
even to ask the jury to suppose such a hat were found, where the hypothetical state-
ment was intended only as an illustration of a general proposition relative to circum-
stantial evidence. 6 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1807, at 266-67 & n.2 (3d ed. 1940); see
text at notes 57-59 infra. See also State v. Peirce, 178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916)
(error for prosecutor, in trial of police chief for malfeasance in office, to comment to
jury upon the number of crimes which had been committeed in the past year) ; State
v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950) (defense counsel not permitted to state
that prosecution's chemistry expert had been thrown out of more courts than any
person in the state).
36. Grosse v. State, 11 Tex. App. 364, 377 (1882) (reversible error for prosecutor
to state that "he heard, while out on the street... a citizen remark that it was a great
shame that the defendant should have taken the money of the old man Wucherer...").
See also People v. King, 276 Ill. 138, 114 N.E. 601 (1916) ; Brow v. State, 103 Ind.
133, 2 N.E. 296 (1885); People v. Dane, 59 Mich. 550, 26 N.W. 781 (1886); Note,
Limitations Upon the Prosecution's Summation to the Iury, 42 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S.
73, 76-78 (1951).
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sionary rules for a court to prohibit this type of argument. It becomes
even easier where counsel resorts to his own assertions in summation
precisely because evidence of the proposition has been excluded during
the course of the trial" or has not been offered because of the likelihood
that it would be excluded.3 In all of these cases persuasion is used not
in an attempt to interpret evidence, but in an attempt to substitute for it.
Elaboration of these rules as part of the problem of hearsay 9 becomes
intelligible: counsel is attempting, in the oft-repeated words of the
cases, to testify without subjecting himself to cross-examination.'
BUILDING A THEORY
A prohibition against testimony in summation does not yet pre-
clude "theorizing" upon whatever evidence has been introduced. It has
been said that counsel "has the right in argument to build up a theory
of his case as it is made by the evidence, and often in doing so he may
give expression to thoughts which have been drawn from the realms
of his imagination." " The difficult problem is that of determining
the extent to which the case "made by the evidence" limits resort to the
rather richer resources of counsel's imagination. The advocate who
builds a theory strictly within the evidence is doing no more than
drawing inferences. Furthermore, in order not to inhibit counsel in
stating the evidence in the light most favorable to his own client,' the
rule has developed that inferences may be invited even where the
reasoning "be faulty, . deductions from the premises illogi-
cal. .
There is also value in allowing counsel to discuss gaps in the
evidence which concern significant, but legally dispensable, questions
37. E.g., Chellis Realty Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 79 N.H. 231, 106 Adt. 742
(1919); Marshall v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 451, 455-56, 182 S.W. 1106, 1108 (1915);
1 THoMPsoN, TRIALS § 970 (2d ed. 1912) ; cf. Allen v. State, 66 Miss. 385, 6 So. 242
(1889) (error for prosecutor to argue as indicative of guilt evidence of threats by
defendant admitted only to impeach defense witness).
38. Cf. Proving the Business Background of a Contact, in FULLIR, BASIC CON-
TRACT LAW 415, 416-17 (1947).
39. See 6 WIGMoR, EVID4NCr § 1806 (3d ed. 1940), criticized in Note, 36 COLUM.
L. Rrv. 931, 943 (1936): "Rationales which regard the law of summation as merely
one phase of the rule as to heresay evidence or as a branch of professional ethics
would appear to ignore the proper function of persuasion."
40. "When counsel are permitted to state [unevidenced] facts in argument and to
comment upon them, the usage of the Courts in regulating trials is departed from,
the laws of evidence are violated, and the full benefit of trial by Jury is therefore
denied.... To an extent not definable, yet to a dangerous extent, they [statements
of counsel] are evidence, not given under oath-without cross-examination, and ir-
respective of all those precautionary rules by which competency is tested." Mitchum v.
State, 11 Ga. 615, 630 (1852). See also Tucker v. Hennicker, 41 N.H. 317, 325 (1860).
41. Hart, J. in People v. Rossi, 37 Cal. App. 778, 782, 174 Pac. 916, 918 (1918).
42. 1 THomPsoN, TRIALS § 957, at 812 (2d ed. 1912).
43. People v. Carter, 116 Cal. App. 2d 533, 538, 253 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1953),
quoting People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 552, 89 Pac. 124, 128 (1907). See text at
notes 1-4 supra.
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such as motive, and even to suggest alternatives which would explain
his view of the case. The risk is obvious. There is concern lest the
suggestions of counsel be accepted as proven fact." Although the cases
have been far from uniform in evaluating this risk, ' factors influencing
the decisions are not difficult to isolate. Relatively little harm is likely
to result to a defendant by the prosecutor's listing of several alternative
hypotheses to explain defendant's acts, where the acts alone are neces-
sary elements of the crime charged.4" The very statement of alterna-
tives guards against the possibility that the "jury could reasonably
have believed that the assertions . . . were based upon information
or knowledge of facts that the speaker possessed which had not been
developed in the evidence." "'
Fear that hypotheses will be misunderstood as the equivalent of
evidence is reflected in judicial concern for the form in which the
argument is couched. Since counsel may not testify upon his own
authority without becoming a witness,48 statements made "as of fact"
are objectionable.4" This, however, is no litmus-like test to be applied
mechanically. On the one hand, courts will pierce form for substance
so that statements which, from the total context, really emerge as
"testimony" of counsel will not be immunized from attack by the mere
prefix of some such formula as: "You are entitled to infer from the evi-
dence in the case. .. ." 8 On the other hand, reasonable comment is
44. People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 831 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ; see note 48
infra. But see People v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 539, 66 Pac. 794, 797 (1901) ("his
theory that the motive of the crime was robbery, as put forward in his argument to
the jury, may have had no support in the evidence, but an unfounded argument is not
misconduct").
45. Perhaps some decisions have imposed undue restraint. See, e.g., Grissom v.
Dahart Ice Cream Co., 34 Ala. App. 282, 40 So. 2d 333 (1949) (prosecutor not
permitted to suggest that if plaintiff had been working for one of the co-defendants
they would have brought in records of her employment, because no evidence that
they kept such records). But cf. People v. Carter, 116 Cal. App. 2d 533, 253 P.2d
1016 (1953) (attorney permitted to inform jury that he had not used expert hand-
writing analysts in forgery prosecution because two-handed forgers were difficult to
detect by inspection).
46. People v. Kinder, 265 P.2d 24, 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) ("The reasons
advanced were merely conjectures on the part of the prosecutor. The ultimate question
presented was left to the jury.").
47. The quoted language is from People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 832 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1952), a case in which the argument was held clearly improper because the
risk described was present.
48. Kennedy v. State, 240 Ala. 689, 690, 196 So. 884, 885 (1940) (prosecutor's
detailed theory of argument which led to homicide contradicted sworn testimony of
defense witnesses); State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 80, 115 So. 370, 375 (1928) (de-
fense attorney not permitted to explain why he had chosen defense of insanity) ; see
note 151 infra.
49. Nix v. State, 32 Ala. App. 136, 137-38, 22 So. 2d 449, 450 (1945) ; Harris v.
State, 28 Ala. App. 528, 532, 189 So. 787, 791 (1939).
50. See People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 832 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). See also
Hartley v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 91 Minn. 382, 384, 98 N.W. 198, 200 (1904)
(charge that opposing party had instigated criminal prosecution, prefaced by "we sus-
pect," held improper although not reversible error).
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safeguarded by a tendency to construe, "in the absence of anything to
the contrary, the solicitor's remarks . . . as a deduction from the evi-
dence." "' Greater freedom seems to be accorded counsel's attempts to
attack the credibility of witnesses, regardless of the form of the state-
ment.
52
There are obvious limits which even the most unmistakable theo-
rizing must not transgress. The court will prevent counsel from
speculating about defenses which have already been ruled out of the
case."3 Nor should counsel be permitted to theorize when his manner
and language, despite the use of tenable hypotheses, are calculated to,
or naturally do, result in unfair prejudice, particularly to a defendant
in a criminal prosecution.54
Permission to theorize thus emerges as a rule consistent with
the general prohibition against arguing facts not in evidence. It is this
prohibition which is central to our inquiry. To say this much does
not dispose of the problem of traveling outside the record; it serves
only to introduce it. Even hypotheses aside, counsel is not limited in
argument 55 to the use of statements which he knows to be true. On
the contrary, fiction, anecdotes, jokes and Bible stories are commonly
regarded as acceptable."0 Nor is it easy to articulate a rule at once
defining the permitted use of that which does not even purport to be
true and the prohibited use of what may well be true. Wigmore freely
confesses difficulty in the attempt, essays a generalization," adds an
51. Floyd v. State, 143 Ga. 286, 289, 84 S.E. 971, 972 (1915); see also Biggers
v. State, 19 Ga. App. 604, 605, 91 S.E. 919 (1917) ; People v. Edgar, 34 Cal. App. 459,
468, 167 Pac. 891, 894 (1917).
52. Waters v. State, 150 Ga. 623, 625, 104 S.E. 626, 627 (1920) (permissible for pros-
ecutor to suggest that jury ignore testimony of joint indictee that he had done the kill-
ing because in his own trial the defendant would similarly swear for his benefit) ; Laska
v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 679-80 (10th Cir. 1936) (proper to argue that co-defend-
ants had testified falsely in hope that leniency would be given their pleas of guilty, but
improper to speculate as to the court's reason for deferring sentence). But see People
v. Margeson, 99 Mich. 146, 147-48, 57 N.W. 1099 (1894) (prosecutor may not state
that expert had testified to defendant's insanity in order to get business for his sana-
torium) ; Hartley v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 91 Minn. 382, 387, 98 N.W. 198, 200
(1904) (arguing a suspicion that opposing party had instigated criminal prosecution
held improper although not reversible error).
53. Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 764-65, 115 S.E. 382, 391-92 (1922).
54. See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 398 (1897); People v. Kirkes,
243 P.2d 816, 831-33 (Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1952).
55. It is often said that counsel is allowed the "largest and most liberal freedom
of speech" in argument. E.g., Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N.H. 317, 323 (1860). The opin-
ion goes on to add that counsel's "illustrations may be as various as the resources of
his genius," ibid., although the holding in the case was that improper argument required
reversal. See text and citations at note 104 infra.
56. Sheffield v. Lewis, 287 S.W.2d 531, 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) : "It is well-
settled law in Texas that the facts of a case may in argument be related to history,
fiction, personal experience, anecdotes, Bible Stories or jokes." The remainder of this
article will examine the extent to which a statement this broad in scope requires mod-
ification.
57. 6 WIGMORE, EvoENacE § 1807, at 267 (3d ed. 1940) : "It seems difficult to frame
a definition which will accurately draw the line of distinction for such cases. One sug-
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obfuscating footnote with "another way" to reach the same result"
and concludes with quotations from courts which "have tried in various
phrasings to express the necessary distinction, though not with the
clearest success." " What is needed is an analysis of the factors which
make for proper use of fiction, for permitted and proscribed reference
by counsel to his personal experiences and for the prohibition against
arguing that which purports to be true in situations where fiction might
well have been allowed.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Fiction
An abstract proposition concerning probability values in the
weighing of evidence is not likely to do much by way of persuading
twelve jurors. Illustrate the proposition with a concrete, easily under-
stood example and the effect is likely to be telling. Counsel may desire
to inform the jury that circumstantial evidence can be of such quality
as to preclude the need for eyewitness testimony in establishing cer-
tainty of guilt. He would probably do better by retelling how Robinson
Crusoe, having discovered a footprint in the sand, knew without doubt
that there was another man on his island. It is not important that
Robinson Crusoe is a fictional character. There is brought home to
the jury, in concrete terms, "the general truth that circumstantial evi-
dence may produce absolute persuasion in the mind." " Fiction may
thus be used to make a permissible abstract assertion intelligible to the
trier of the fact. It serves to illustrate a generalization whose truth is,
as a matter of common knowledge, already "known" to judge and
jury. Illustration may also serve an added function. It may increase
the jury's estimate of the probability of a particular fact being true.
Thus, to assert that experts may make mistakes or may lie is unlikely
to have the impact of an anecdote whose humorous effect comes from
an immediate demonstration of an expert's fallibility.6 The chuckle
gestion, however, may be useful; namely, that a test may often be made by asking
if it is immaterial for the case in hand whether the specific fact asserted be trite or not;
if its truth is thus immaterial, then its force will lie merely in symbolizing or illustrat-
ing a general truth, and its employment will be proper."
58. "[P]lace the word 'suppose' before the assertion of the fact stated, and notice
whether it equally serves the purpose." Wigmore then gives an example taken from
Robinson Crusoe and adds: "Here it is seen that the force of the fact as merely an
illustration is in no way diminished by making the assertion hypothetical." 6 id. § 1807
n.2. However, Wigmore appears to prohibit many arguments even with the word "sup-
pose" actually prefixed by counsel. See notes 62 infra and 35 supra.
59. 6 id. at 267.
60. 6 id. at 266.
61. Witness the following story quoted to the jury by M. Labori, counsel for M.
Emile Zola: "Once an expert was discussing before the presiding judge B6rard des
Glasjeux the similarity in writing between an anonymous document and other docu-
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or laugh serves to fix the story in the jury's mind; the credible tale
invites the jurors repeatedly to inquire of themselves whether identical
factors may not be operating in the very case being argued.
The Case-Oriented Illustration
Suppose counsel eschew the usual sources of fiction and prefer to
fabricate his own hypothetical illustration, using the general setting of
the case in which he argues, but adding elements not supported by the
evidence. What if he demonstrate the force of circumstantial evidence
by asking the jury to consider the weight they would give to the dis-
covery of a hat with the initials of defendant near the scene of the
alleged homicide, although no evidence has been introduced on this
point? From the viewpoint of formal logic this illustration may
be identical with one provided by Defoe, but real dangers inhere
in it. There is the risk that counsel will convey the impression
that he is in fact asserting that such a hat was found. Balancing
what little there is to be gained against the prejudice potential,
there is reason for exclusion. In an early case counsel asked the
jury to suppose that defendant's accomplice had made statements
corroborating defendant's guilt." Lumpkin, J., after adequate expres-
sion of "unfeigned pride and pleasure" in proper "effusions of forensic
eloquence," sharply condemns the use of this type of hypothetical,
terming it a surreptitious array of facts unproven. It is "highly repre-
hensible," he asserts, for "counsel to undertake by a side wind to get
that in as proof which is merely conjecture. ." Wigmore is
entirely in accord.64 Legitimate illustration has the potential of a dual
role. As indicated above, it may serve to concretize an abstract propo-
sition. It also invites the jury to apply the proposition in evaluating
the evidence in the case being litigated. Illustration by a fictitious
variation of the evidence is likely to do more; 65 it may engender a con-
fusion which results in the jurors accepting fiction for fact.
ments introduced for comparison. 'The writing of the anonymous documents,' said he,
'in no way resembles that of the other documents, but in one corner of the paper there
is a marginal note in pencil. This is clearly in the hand of the accused. There is no
doubt about it.' 'Then,' said the judge, 'I am the forger. I am the author of the mar-
ginal note."' THE TRiAL OF EMILE ZOLA 314 (Tucker ed. 1898). See text at notes
104-07 infra.
62. Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 521 (1851). A truncated version of the argument
given by the court in its opinion indicates that counsel presented the statement prefixed
by "suppose"; there is no indication of the purpose of the supposition or that an illus-
tration was clearly involved. Wigmore cites and quotes the case as an example of
judicial disapproval of the attempt by counsel to make an assertion upon his own
credit. 6 Wimon, Evmi Nc. § 1806, at 259 (3d ed. 1940).
63. Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 522 (1851). It should be noted that the conviction
was nevertheless affirmed. See discussion in text at notes 91-93 infra.
64. 6 Wimon, EvmzNc8 § 1807(1) (3d ed. 1940).
65. It is this potential confusion which presents the difficulty with Wigmore's"suppose" test for illustration. See note 58 supra. Putting a "suppose" in front of
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Personal Experience of Counsel "
Analogous problems are presented by assertions of counsel made
on the basis of his own experience. It is certainly pernissible for
counsel to urge that a witness employed by one of the litigants may be
biased in favor of his employer. This argument assumes a proposition
about human conduct which is generally conceded both correct aid the
subject of common knowledge; it is a generalization which will be said
to be within the limits of judicial notice and jury knowledge.66  May
counsel illustrate the proposition with instances in which such economic
interest led, e.g., to perjury? May he give examples in which a defend-
ant employer utilized his position to compel false testimony? In
Perry v. Western N.C. Ry. counsel did exactly that. Although pro-
fessing to give an instance "without mentioning any names," "8 he
made it entirely clear that the employer involved in his previous ex-
perience was the defendant in the case being argued. Here there is no
risk of confusing a hypothetical statement with evidence; the argument
includes an assertion of fact directly relevant on the issue of credibility.
This is the equivalent of testimony as to which there has been no oppor-
tunity for cross-examination and no assurance of accuracy. For the
failure of the trial judge "to interfere at the request of opposing
counsel" 69 a new trial was ordered.
The Perry case presents no challenging problems. Appellate
courts have been obliged to deal with a number of instances in which
counsel made unsupported assertions of fact relative to credibility," or
to the customs of a profession,7 or the scene of an accident.7" -That
counsel in .Perry did so under the guise of illustrating an acceptable
general proposition is of no moment; the harm of introducing inadmis-
sible "evidence" is not thereby mitigated. The case falls squarely within
hypothesized factual data taken from the context of the case being tried would probably
equally serve the purpose of illustrating the commonly known general proposition.
The objection upon which most courts refuse the argument is that the hypothesized
facts do more than serve the purpose of illustration. See note 62 supra.
66. See MCCORMIcK, EvIDINcE 691 (1954) : "The jury has the power, analogous
to the power of the judge, to consider as if proven, facts within the common knowledge
of the community. Accordingly, . . . counsel may, without evidence, argue the truth
of such facts. . ....
67. 128 N.C. 471, 39 S.E. 27 (1901).
68. Id. at 474, 39 S.E. at 28.
69. Id. at 476, 39 S.E. at 29.
70. See, e.g., State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 306-07, 46 So. 2d 262, 279 (1950);
Haggard v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 354, 356, 269 S.W. 438, 439 (1925).
71. See Moore v. Holroyd, 219 Ala. 392, 395, 122 So. 349, 351 (1929) ; cf. People
v. Carter, 116 Cal. App. 2d 533, 538, 253 P.2d 1016, 1020 (1953) ; Winstead v. Com-
monwealth, 195 Ky. 484, 243 S.W. 40 (1922).
72. See Ward v. Brown, 122 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
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the previously-considered category of prohibited testimonial asser-
tions.73
A more interesting question-is presented by counsel's recounting
personal experiences sufficiently divorced from the case being litigated
that they could in no wise be thought to constitute "testimony." May
counsel argue, e.g., the weight to be accorded circumstantial evidence
by stating "I have seen men sent to the gallows without a single eye-
witness . . ." ? I This was the tactic of a prosecuting attorney who
had also seen men sent "to the penitentiary for life on entirely cir-
cumstantial evidence, and oftentimes on the testimony of only one
witness. I have seen, and you have, too," he argued, "where a man
was hung, and before death they had confessed where they had denied
the crime on the witness stand." " Although the argument is couched
in terms of the personal experience of counsel, probably little would be
lost by use of the form "We are all aware" or "You yourselves have
heard." If this be so, then it is not merely the proposition illustrated
which is common knowledge; the very facts of the illustration would
stand on the same footing. In the parlance of the courts, the jury is
being "reminded" of what they already "know": that convictions are
had on less than two eyewitnesses, that defendants who assert innocence
at a trial may thereafter confess. This is the analysis of the court in
Winstead v. Commonwealth ,76 affirming a judgment of conviction.
Analytically, then, the significance of the illustration does not turn on
the fact that counsel asserts it as his own experience, nor is it of great
importance whether counsel has or has not observed such cases; the
argument is "based upon an assumed common experience of all man-
kind." 7
To say this much is not yet to probe the problem deeply, nor even
to report the Winstead case adequately. The court in Winstead refused
squarely to hold the argument of counsel proper. Instead, the opinion
points out that "it could not have been prejudicial, even if it can be
regarded as improper," albeit adding, "which in our judgment is at
least doubtful." 78 Positing the propriety of illustration from fiction,
can any of these observations reported by counsel, which may or may
not be true, stand on any worse footing? Two further examples, each
of which divided a court of last resort, may prove helpful in the analysis.
73. See text at note 36 supra.
74. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 484, 493, 243 S.W. 40, 44 (1922).
75. Ibid.
76. 195 Ky. 484, 243, S.W. 40 (1922).
77. Id. at 494, 243 S.W. at 44-45.
78. Id. at 494, 243 S.W. at 45.
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In State v. Horr 79 the prosecuting attorney urged conviction, asserting,
"In my experience I have seen juries bring in verdicts of guilty on less
favorable testimony to the state than this has been." 80 Finally, in
Kuehl v. Hamilton,81 a motor vehicle accident case in which liability
turned on whether plaintiff's conceded negligence was a proximate
cause of the accident, counsel told how the very day before his argu-
ment he had himself been "tagged" by a policeman for speeding. The
point of the story was that rear view mirrors are "not infallible," a
rather relevant consideration inasmuch as plaintiff's negligence con-
sisted in not having such a mirror and the accident occurred while he
was pulling his truck into the left lane of traffic in order to pass another
car. In Horr the court reversed; in Kuehl the court affirmed. In both
cases majority and dissenters agreed that the argument was improper.
Two factors bear analysis; both have figured in judicial opinions.
First, the experience of counsel is presented not as fiction, but as an
actual occurrence. Conceivably, a jury may be more impressed with
the probability-potential of what has in fact already occurred than with
a tale conjured up by some author. That juries actually convict in
capital cases, even in the absence of eyewitnesses, is likely to be more
forceful to a wavering juror than the mental state of a Defoe character.
Secondly, counsel occupies a rather unique and central position. The
assertion of his own experience or observation is for this reason likely
to carry extra weight,"' particularly where he appears in the role of a
public official charged with protecting the public interest. He may be
viewed as setting forth examples of a proper standard, one which has
been applied and which he, in his official capacity, believes should be
applied.' In supporting his position with argument from personal
experience, one judge contended forcefully, 4 counsel violates the spirit
if not the letter of the canon of legal ethics which provides that "It
is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his
79. 63 Utah 22, 221 Pac. 867 (1923).
80. Id. at 46, 221 Pac. at 876.
81. 136 Ore. 240, 297 Pac. 1043 (1931).
82. Cf. the following statement by Shinn, P.J. in People v. Kirkes, 243 P2d 816,
831 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952): "The closing argument of the deputy district attorney
must be considered as coming from one who by virtue of his office and as a represen-
tative of the State wields great power and influence. A statement of the prosecutor to
the jury that he believes the defendant to be guilty is weighted with the authority of
his office. It is a declaration of a conclusion he has reached in his official capacity. ...
It means that the district attorney ... has passed on to the jury his own conclusion,
fortified by his experience and knowledge in such matters and by the public confidence
and prestige which he enjoys." Reversal in Kirkes was for a roster of errors in argu-
ment. It should be noted that the district attorney had himself emphasized his role and
responsibility as a public official.
83. State v. Horr, 63 Utah 22, 221 Pac. 867 (1923).
84. Kelly, J. in Kuehl v. Hamilton, 136 Ore. 240, 255, 297 Pac. 1043, 1048 (1931)
(dissenting opinion).
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client's innocence or in the justice of his cause." 85 In short, two
risks are said to be inherent in the use of the advocate's personal ex-
perience: first, the jury may be unduly influenced by assuming as true
an illustration which has not been proved; second, the jury may be
unduly impressed with the professional experience or the public status
of the lawyer arguing. His experiences may be improperly equated
with a proper standard. Whether these risks are substantial remains
to be considered. No less important is the need to consider whether
the risks appear with sufficient frequency to warrant a fixed rule of
prohibition.
Preliminarily one may observe that we know little enough about
the processes of jury decision. We cannot speak with assurance of
the impact which an assertion of fact is likely to make compared to that
of an illustration born of an attorney's giving "play to his wit, or wing
to his imagination." s' Experimentation may provide some answers.1
7
Until then, we may hazard the guess that other factors, ranging from
the personality of the advocate to his skill in selecting the raw materials
of argument, will reduce the experience-versus-fiction distinction to
insignificance, at least in the usual run of cases. The relevance of the
canon governing assertion of personal belief fares no better. It is ob-
vious enough that a prosecutor may, by indirect statements, serve the
purpose of expressing his own confidence in the guilt of the accused.
That he falls short of direct, unequivocal assertion will not prevent
judicial scrutiny of such remarks. Sometimes these indirections do
no more than skirt the border of transgression, sometimes they are
held to violate the rule."8 Arguing in terms of personal experience
could be used as a device for suggesting counsel's personal belief in
the justice of his cause. Is this, however, a substantial basis for a
85. CANONS O9 PROEMSSIONAL EThics No. 15; see DRINiR, LrGAL EThics 146-47
(1953).
86. Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 631 (1852).
87. See KALVEN, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT OF THE UNIVERSITY OV CHICAGO
LAW SCHOOL (text of speech delivered at Ann Arbor, Michigan, Nov. 5, 1955, on file
in Biddle Law Library) (describing some experiments being performed) ; cf. Weld &
Roff, A Study in the Formulation of Opinion Based Upon Legal Evidence, 51 AM. J.
PsYcH. 609 (1938).
88. Compare People v. Head, 108 Cal. App. 2d 734, 737, 239 P2d 506, 508 (1952)
("A reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor's argument in reference to his belief
that all defendants were guilty of the offense as charged, is that it was clearly predi-
cated upon his statement that he believed the evidence showed that they were guilty."),
with People v. Cascio, 219 La. 819, 826, 54 So. 2d 95, 98 (1951) ("A re-examination
of the case has convinced us that the statement . . . that the accused was 'involved in
the matter' imports that he was of the opinion that defendant was guilty of the crime
charged."). Several courts have set up a dichotomy which permits the prosecutor to
express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused based upon the evidence adduced at
the trial, while preventing an opinion which is not accompanied by any qualification.
Compare State v. Horton, 151 La. 683, 92 So. 298 (1922), with Balis v. State, 137 Neb.
835, 291 N.W. 477 (1940). See Notes, 54 CoLum. L. Rzv. 946, 955-56 (1954) ; 42 J.
CRim. L., C. & P.S. 73, 76-78 (1951).
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general prohibition of illustrations- drawn from counsel's experience?
The'factual context should be controlling; a sweeping prohibition goes
too far. It is revealing that the case in Which it was urged so strongly
that the rule against expression of counsel's personal belief justifies
prohibiting use of his personal experiences-was precisely one in which,
on its facts, this argument seemed inappropriate. Counsel had re-
counted an incident involving his own rear-view mirror in illustrating
a point about causation of a motor vehicle accident. The opinion's
reasoning seems far-fetched if one considers the rationale of the ethical
canon. The only reason in support of that rule with the slightest
relevance to the problem of the particular case is the possibility of
"improper advantage to the older and better known lawyer, whose
opinion would carry more weight, and also with the jury- at least, an
undue advantage to an unscrupulous one." " Again one may doubt that
the applicability of these factors will be general.
More significantly, pursuit of distinctions as subtle as these with
a view to the development of finespun doctrine, to be rigorously en-
forced and assiduously refined, would be most unhappy. We must
avoid at all cost the creation of a "multiplicity of rules" ' with an
unreality rivaling that of which we would rid the law of admissibility.
What appears indicated is maximum flexibility at both the trial and the
appellate levels. Certainly the factors appropriate for consideration
in administration of a flexible system should be articulated, but the
context must not be one of hard and fast rules. A number of doctrines
are currently available to insure flexibility on appeal. Concededly
improper argument may be found no basis for reversal because the error
below, in total context, is not considered prejudicial; " or because
comment of court or advocate has "cured" it; ' or because no oppor-
89. DRINxiR, LEGAL ETHICS 147 (1953).
90. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Co.nmmunicating, 5 VAND. L. RXV. 277 (1952).
91. See, e.g., Winstead v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 484, 243 S.W. 40 (1922);
State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676 (,1923) ; State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 98
A.2d 295 (1953) ; cf. People v. Travis, 129 Cal. App.-2d 29, 276 P.2d 193 (1954). For
analysis of the various tests formulated for prejudicial error, see Note, 36 COLUM. L.
.REv. 931, 938-39 (1936).
92. See, e.g., Effron-Kushner & Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 195 Iowa 1169,
1171, 193 N.W. 539, 541 (1923) ; Kuehl v. Hamilton, 136 Ore. 240, 297 Pac. 1043
(1931) (semble); 1 THomIPsOx, TRIALS § 960 (2d ed. 1912). There is serious question
as to the validity of the psychological assumption which underlies the doctrine that
instructions by the court will erase from jurors' minds, and from their verdict, any
prejudicial effect of an improper argument. Cf. KALVN, lREPORT ON TIE JuRY PROJ ECP
oF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHIcAO LAW ScHOOL 24 (text of speech delivered af Ann
Arbor, Michigan, Nov. 5, 1955, on file in Biddle Law Library), describing experiments
in instructions as to insurance coverage of defendants in tort cases: "We are tempted
to conclude therefore that instructing the jury about insurance will tend to keep them
from talking about it,. but will also tend tQ increase the frequency with which they
do something affirmative about it."
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tunity for correctior was. afforded by timely. objection.93 Nor are
courts hestitant to use these traditional devices, for agreement of the
justices on the impropriety-of a particular argument is often submerged
in sharp dissent over whether or not to reverse.94  Provision for dis-
cretion in the trial judge, who. is usually best qualified to gauge the
impact in context of a challenged statement,"5 is a nqeded supplement
at the nisi prius levl. 6 . -
This does, not yet discharge, a. full measure of .responsibility.
The bar is entitled to an articulation of policy which will assist,
before the fact, 7 . in segregating -the .permissible from the prohib-
ited, the ethical from the unethical. By the same token, a trial judge
might well be aided by the restatement of the .factors which should con-
trol the exercise of discretion, guideposts against which to measure
his decisions. In the area of argument on the basis of the personal
experience of counsel a practicable rule would allow the trial court to
exercise his discretion, recognizing that where the truth of the assertion
.was not judicially ascertainable particular caution. should be exercised
that the fact of the incident being asserted as.true was not likely to be
unduly. significant and recqgnizing further, -that as part of this test,
the position of the lawyer as one familiar with the law and the courts
might tend in a particular case to make-it so. The personal credibility
of counsel should be minimized as a factor in jury decision.
93. See Spahn v. People's Ry., 3 Boy'ce 302, 323, 92 Atl. 727, 730 (Del. Super. Ct.
1912) (counsel's reference to the pain caused by his-own knee injury improper, but
not reversible error because opposing party did not object at the trial) ; 1 TH o xPSO,
TRIALs § 957 (2d.ed. 1912).
94. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Hamilton, 136 Ore 240, 297 Pac. 1043 (1931) ; State v.
Horr, 63 Utah 22, 221 Pac. 867 (1923).
95. That the trial judge is best qualified to evaluate in this type of situation is
an assumption which should be tested scientifically. It may well be, e.g., that the very
closeness of the trial judge to the case is likely to deny him a sense of perspective
which an appellate court can achieve. Of course the law has indulged our basic assump-
tion so often with respect to other problems of appellati review that it may appear a
truism rather than an assumption, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it
seems a plausible hypothesis.
96. At present, -of course, the trial judge has some discretionary powers which
apply equally to argument. He may influence the jury in his remarks by way of "cure,"
he may grant or withhold a new trial with relatively little fear of reversal. A grant
of discretion specifically with respect to arguments would increase the range of the
judge's powers and is likely, in addition, to focus more sharply the judge's responsi-
bility in this area. Cf. Wigmore, Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in the Next Century, in
1 LAw: A C5NURY oF PROGRXSs 347, 368 (Reppy ed. 1937), where he suggests as
part of a summary of non-jury trial principles that the trial judge's ruling not be final
insofar as the judge may state an erroneous principle of evidence, but that it be final
in the "application of any rule of evidence to a particular offer."
97. If any rule of discretion is thought to lack the- predictability which counsel
preparing for argument may wel desire, it is only possible to suggest that in the pres-
ent state of authorities unqualified approval of counsel's use of his personal experi-
ences is not likely, although of course reversal is by no means automatic. See, e.g.,
.Spahn v. People's Ry.,- 3 Boyce 302, 92 Atl. 727 (Del. Super. Ct. 1912) (counsel's
reference to the pain caused by his own knee injury improper, but not reversible error
- because opposing patty did not object at the trial) ; Winstead" v, Commonwealth, 195
Ky. 484, 243 S.W. 40 (1922) ; Kuehl v. Hamilton, 136 Ore. 240, 297 Pac. 1043 (1931).
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Applying these factors to a given case there may well be reason
for requiring more rigorous adherence to a higher standard on the part
of prosecuting attorneys in criminal cases.9" Their unique obligations
and their official role offer the potentiality of greater harm from a
particular remark. More significantly, there is evidence of a judicial
sensitivity to the risk of circumventing the presumption of innocence, 9
replacing it with one that public officials do not prosecute men whom
they believe innocent. The risk of prejudice against a criminal de-
fendant is particularly great where the prosecutor attempts comparisons
with the evidence in other cases.1' °  State v. Horr'' is an example.
The district attorney's statement that he knew juries to have convicted
on less evidence was held reversible error. Dissent and majority
joined in condemning the argument; importing an external standard of
sufficiency to convict was improper. This is particularly true since
this is the type of case in which the jury may well consider the district
attorney to have an unusual competence. Here, then, was an assertion
of unproved fact, the verity of which is unknown to the court, being
used to persuade. It does not require particularly fertile imaginations
to consider the possibility that this "illustration" carried more weight
with the jury in fixing the level of reasonable doubt than did the
relevant portions of the judge's charge."0 2 In the rear-view mirror
case, the court also found agreement on the impropriety of arguing
from personal experience, the majority holding no reversible error, but
the dissenting judge urging strongly that the illustration of counsel,
including assertions of fact which could not be verified, were likely to
have been of determinative weight. 03
98. "It is the privilege of defense counsel to go farther afield in argument than
the prosecutor may go. Their theories and their statements of opinion as spokesmen
for the defendant have little weight as compared with similar statements of the dis-
trict attorney." People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). "The
... [prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecu-
tion is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Viereck v. United
States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943), quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935); cf. People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 678, 245 P.2d 633, 649 (1952).
But see State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 434, 175 So. 4, 18, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 635
(1937) ; State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 716, 112 So. 655, 661 (1927).
99. Cf. State v. Coleman, 49 Tex. Crim. 82, 86, 90 S.W. 499, 501 (1905).
100. For further elaboration of this problem see text at p. 157 infra.
101. 63 Utah 22, 221 Pac. 867 (1923).
102. Even in this case there is room for disagreement. There was a vigorous dis-
sent on the question of whether to reverse. Id. at 49, 221 Pac. at 878. Wigmore ap-
proved the dissent. 6 WiGmORE, EVmENCE § 1807 n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
103. Kuehl v. Hamilton, 136 Ore. 240, 256, 297 Pac. 1043, 1048 (1931). It is in-
teresting that the majority, while not yet approving the use of the unproved tale, found
a reasonable analogy to a statement of the experience of men with rear view mirrors.
Altogether, it may be doubted that the story of counsel's experience was sufficiently
more effective than one couched in terms of "Haven't you ever been driving when
. . ." to warrant a finding of impropriety. See text at note 75 supra,
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The "Celebrated" Case and Reading From Books
Tales of what other juries have done in similar trials,"0 4 of ultimate
confessions by accused who had protested innocence,'"° or of severe
sentences meted out on less evidence are often offered on the personal
veracity of counsel and have figured in the preceding discussion of
argument based on the advocate's own experience. They constitute pre-
cisely the kind of case in which the risks there considered are likely to
materialize. But counsel may, and often does, attempt to refer to
similar litigation with which he does not claim a personal familiarity. 0 6
These references range from anecdote-like instances which are said to
have occurred before a venerated local judge 107 to classic trials of
history.
In State v. Jenkins '" the prosecuting attorney detailed the events
of a prior prosecution, including a subsequent confession, without
offering any explanation as to the source of his information. The
context, however, was clearly one in which the incident was being
offered as true, and the appellate court held the argument improper.
Certainly failure to ascribe any source should not be expected to result
in more favored treatment than that accorded the personal experience
of counsel, particularly since, in context, counsel appeared to be as-
serting that the facts had occurred precisely as he was relating them.
The personal veracity of the advocate is no less involved because the
assertion of truth is by implication rather than by explicit statement.
Discussion of famous trials stands on a somewhat different foot-
ing. The basis for assuming truth is the common knowledge of the
community."09 In a Louisiana case "' the prosecuting attorney referred
to the Leopold and Loeb trial, urging the jury to reject a defense of
104. See Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 528, 13 S.W.2d 521 (1929); State v.
Corpening, 157 N.C. 621, 73 S.E. 214 (1911); Rodriquez v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 275,
125 S.W. 403 (1910) ; State v. Horr, 63 Utah 22, 221 Pac. 867 (1923) ; cf. Tucker v.
Hennicker, 41 N.H. 317 (1860) (improper for counsel to refer to damages awarded
by referee in a similar case).
105. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 484, 243 S.W. 40 (1922).
106. The analysis of this section is not intended to apply to the many cases which
consider the right of counsel to argue the law of the case. See generally 1 THlompSON,
TRIALs §§ 940-51 (2d ed. 1912). The primary focus of this article is a consideration
of sources available to counsel in the argument of propositions which are properly
open for treatment by him. Other topics such as the propriety of arguing the efficacy
of capital punishment to the jury are also outside the scope of the present inquiry. See
note 120 infra.
107. Jenkins v. State, 49 Tex. Grim. 457, 93 S.W. 726 (1906). But see note 61
supra.
108. 49 Tex. Crim. 457, 93 S.W. 726 (1906).
109. See Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 528, 13 S.W.2d 521 (1929); Tyree v.
Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 596, 279 S.W. 990 (1926) ; State v. Davis, 83 N.H. 435, 144
Atl. 124 (1928) ; State v. McAlister, 133 S.C. 83, 130 S.E. 511 (1925). See also note 66
supra.
110. State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927).
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insanity. This the Supreme Court found -unobjectionable. Such re-
ferences, tke opinion points out, are no more prejudicial to the defend-
ant than if counsel "had referred-to the story of Cain and Abel, or the
assassination of Julius Caesar oi the French Revolution; just 'as the
attorney for thedefendant would have been quite free, if he chose todo
so, to refer to Magha Charta, the Bill of Rights, and the Declarati6n
of Independence, without overstepping the bounds'of propriety' in any
manner whatever. Literature and history are open to all men; and the
Leopold and Loeb Case is an event in current history .... ,' It
is only a slight extension to cases of more local and less persevering
interest, the facts of. which are sufficiently well known to prove helpffll
in argument" 2
That a case may be referred to because well known in a particular
community does not permit of any use which an advocate may care to
make of it. Choice of language may run afoul of the general rulewith
respect to prejudicial statements,"" and the addition of facts not gen-
erally known but'vouched for on the personal credibility'of counsel
would fare no bettei-." 4 Likewise use of the case to illustrate a proposi-
tion in itself improper would not be sanctioned." 5 In short, the
famous case, as a generally known fact of ancient or contemporaneous
history, satisfies the requirement with respect to a proper source of
unproved fact; it avoids the risk of an untruth passing for truth. It
must yet satisfy whatever other requirements are germane to the par-
ticular argument.
A further source of information about similar prosecutions is
.published works such as Professor Borchard's Convicting the Innocent,
a collection of sixty-five case studies assembled to disprove the proposi-
tion that "innocent men are never convicted. . . ." "' Obviously,
this is the kind of material, scholarly, competent and highly relevant to
the proper evaluation of identification testimony and circumstantial
evidence, which defense counsel could use to advantage. Illustration of
the infirmities inherent in the use of mere men as witnesses drawn
from these instances is likely to be highly effective. Certainly, object-
ing district attorneys appear to have thought so."17 Use of Borchard's
book might have been thought to fall squarely within the rule which
111. Id. at 717, 112 So. at 661.
112. See State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 180 So. 630 (1938).
113. See text at note 27 supra.
114. See text at note 35 supra.
115. See text at notes 120-21 infra.
116. Preface to BORCHARD, CONVIcTING Vn INNOCENT (1932)-.
117. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 13 'S.E2d 820 -(1941) (semble);
Osteen v. State, 83 Ga. App. 346, 63 S.E.2d 416 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Roberts,
44 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 175 (Luzerne" County, Pa. C.P. 1952),
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states that ". . . counsel in their arguments have the right to use
illustrations from history or literature or any other stock of common
knowledge." "1 The holdings do not support so simple an affirmation.
What is required is an analysis of the problems raised by the use of
relevant books.
In a relatively recent Pennsylvania case defense counsel "was
halted when he waved a book in front of the jury, told them its author
was Lewis E. Lawes, a former' warden at Sing Sing prison, and
[stated] that it was shown in this book that the number of murder
cases had decreased in States which had abolished capital punish-
ment." 19 The first problem presented is whether the subject matter
of the argument, the deterrent effect of capital punishment, is within
the scope of what the jury may properly consider in fixing its penalty.
Some cases have answered that question in the negative. 20 Obviously,
then, the problem of what may be used in 'support of the argument is
never reached; the topic is not appropriate for consideration. The
Pennsylvania court did not rest its decision on that ground.' 2' It met
head-on the question of whether this source of material was an ap-
propriate one. The opinion on this point is interesting. Justice (later
Chief Justice) Stern rejects the contenfion that Warden Lawes' work
is literature, within the meaning of that term as used in the earlier
cases. "Obviously," he states, "the 'illustrations from history, litera-
ture or any other stock of common -knowledge' were meant to refer
only to universally recognized and accepted works of literature or
science, a limitation which would scarcely include treatises such as that
of Mr. Lawes." ' Yet, this did not require a finding that use of books
and treatises not universally accepted was improper. The court instead
approves a rule of discretion, allowing a latitude to the trial judge
118. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 396, 45 A.2d 43, 45 (1946), quoting
from Commonwealth v. Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 522-23, 164 Atl. 726, 728-29 (1933).
119. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 396, 45 A.2d 43, 45 (1946).
120. "Whether capital punishment is right or wrong, and whether it should be
abolished, is a question of policy which can be determined by the Legislature alone;
and thus to permit counsel to attack that policy, and to show that it is wrong by com-
paring it to the laws of other states which do not have capital punishment, is beyond
the legitimate exercise of the right of counsel to represent their clients?' Jones v. State,
166 Ga. 251, 254, 142 S.E. 866, 867 (1928) ; see Styles v. State, 129 Ga. 425, 59 S.E.
249 (1907).
121. Earlier in his argument counsel was stopped by the court when he urged that
capital- punishment had not proved itself a deterrent to crime, that it had been aban-
doned in a number of states, and that a bill to abolish it was at that very time before
the Pennsylvania legislature. The Supreme Court approved the prohibition of this line
of argument with the terse statement that "the law of the State must be administered
as it presently exists, and it still provides for capital punishment as a penalty in appro-
priate cases." Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 395-96, 45 A.2d 43, 44 (1946).
The court did not revert to this point in considering the argument from Lawes' book.
122. Id. at 396-97, 45 A.2d at 45.
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which, on the record before it, was not abused by a ruling against utili-
zation of the Lawes book.12'
The decision appears sound. Published works which must be
conceded to fall short of the "universally-accepted" criterion may yet
be highly reliable, adequately documented and thus a valuable source
of illustrative material which can bring home to the jury risks inherent
in a particular type of testimony. True, the risk of inaccuracy has not
been eliminated, but contrast the safeguards available in this area with
the dangers in the use of counsel's personal experience. The author
of a work such as produced by Professor Borchard is motivated by no
interest in the present litigation, he stakes a significant professional
reputation on the academic integrity of his product, and the very fact
of publication invites refutation if there be reason to refute.
12 4  Of
course, not all books to which counsel would like to refer in summation
are of this calibre. Reliability is a matter for determination by the
judge, and in making this determination he may legitimately consider
the nature of the proposition being illustrated, its relative simplicity or
complexity, and the extent of support sought in the work being cited.' 25
123. Ibid. In Commonwealth v. Roberts, 44 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 175, 212 (Luzerne
County, Pa. C.P. 1952), Sykes' grant of discretion was interpreted to allow "control
[of the) argument within reasonable limits," as a result of which the court permitted
reference to Borchard, but prohibited reading from it or showing it to the jury.
124. Cf. discussion of the use of learned treatises in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule in text at notes 202-08 infra.
125. In Planebeck v. Chicago Ry., 294 Il. 302, 308, 128 N.E. 513, 515 (1920),
counsel was arguing that a person may receive serious injury without realizing the
extent to which he had been injured, saying: "It has been said that it is a common
thing in war for a person to receive serious injury and not know it. You who have
read this wonderful book, 'Over the Top', know the experiences." The court said: "He
did not undertake to narrate any of the experiences detailed by that book, nor to make
reference to any of the experiences related therein. We think there was nothing in
what he said that seriously violates the rules applicable to argument to juries, and that
plaintiffs were not prejudiced by such an argument." Contrast an attempt by counsel,
in arguing the reliability of memory, to discuss a technical phenomenon such as "rem-
iniscence," see LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES B-314 to 17 (mimeo.
1956), with reference to detailed results of particular experimentation. See text at
notes 214-15 infra.
Some very old cases, which seem not to have attracted a great deal of attention,
justify Wigmore's comment that "in a few jurisdictions a hazy distinction is made
between their [learned treatises] use in 'illustration' and their use as evidence, the
former being sanctioned. But the general opinion discountenances any such uses." 6
WIGMORX, EvmNcZ § 1700(c), at 20 (3d ed. 1940). See also Arnot., 1918D L.R.A.
(n.s.) 4, 81-82. Some of the cases hold that such argument is proper. See, e.g., Harvey
v. State, 40 Ind. 516 (1872) (prosecutor allowed to read from Wharton's Medical
Jurisprudence; opinion does not state that use was as illustration) ; Corey v. Silcox,
6 Ind. 39 (1854). In Corey the lower court had said concerning counsel's reading from
Evans' Millwright Guide: "Like argument of counsel, or any other thing adduced to
illustrate, they may be satisfactory to the jury or they may not." The appellate court
added: "Reason is neither more nor less than reason, because it happens to be read
from a book; and we think that we would be adopting a very difficult rule to enforce,
if we should attempt to compel counsel to use their own arguments for every position
they may assume." Id. at 40. Generally, however, sanction of the use of treatises for
illustration has been by way of dictum, because the argument was irrelevant (Legg
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However, this does not dispose of the total range of problems
in the permissible use of books. It is one thing to refer orally
to the general content of Borchard's volume and quite another to
allow voluminous quotation on the part of an advocate who parades
the full detail of a large number of Borchard's cases before the jury.
Reading from a book of impressive proportions, or from a series of
them,2 6 adds to the risk of undue impact. This is a distinction which
has impressed the courts both where they have allowed and where they
have prohibited the use of books.-2 7 Once again we are reduced to some
assumptions about potential impact on a jury, but until scientific ex-
perimentation establishes the contrary, it would seem reasonable to
assume that leaving a jury with an avalanche of detail taken from a
series of cases in which conviction was a miscarriage of justice might
result in a less objective evaluation of the evidence and application of
a "reasonable doubt" rule than would denial of this privilege to counsel.
Discretion in the trial judge seems an appropriate device with which
to achieve a balance. While counsel should not be denied the oppor-
tunity for effective presentation of the risks of improper conviction,
neither should he be allowed to present a picture so skewed as to
obliterate the distinction between absolute, scientific certitude and the
lesser standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
History and Current Events
If famous cases in the community and the nation are sufficiently
matters of "common knowledge" to be used as illustration, other cur-
rent events which attract equal attention should be no less so. Counsel
in a recent case urged the jury to find defendant's confession un-
reliable because coerced, buttressing his argument with references to
Cardinal Mindszenty and William Oatis and with a description of the
brainwashing to which American soldiers were subjected in Korea. 2 '
This the appellate court held proper, observing that "Every person of
v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 286, 289 (1853) ; Wade v. DeWitt, 20 Tex. 398 (1857)), because
the argument is improper when the court does not instruct that the facts may not be
used as evidence (Yoe v. People, 49 Ill. 410, 412 (1868)) or because the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing the argument (State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651,
675-76, 33 Pac. 287, 291-92 (1893)). Of course, reading treatises as illustration may
go without correction where no objection was made at the trial. See Byers v. Nash-
ville, C. & St. L.R.R., 94 Tenn. 345, 29 S.W. 128 (1895). See also text at notes 222-
34 infra, for discussion of use of scientific data in argument.
126. In Commonwealth v. Roberts, 44 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 175, 212 (Luzerne Coun-
ty, Pa. C.P. 1952), counsel proposed to make use of Borchard, Convicting the Inno-
cent, Gardner, Court of Last Resort and Phillips, Famous Cases of Cirmnumstantial
Evidence. "Each of the books had markers protruding from selected places. Counsel
picked one up and opening it advanced toward the jury when objection was made."
127. See notes 123, 125 and 126 supra.
128. People v. Travis, 129 Cal. App. 2d 29, 276 P.2d 193 (1954).
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common intelligence possessed of superficial information as- to what
has been going on in the world has heard and probably shares the
common belief that, confessions and untruths have been uttered under
compulsion by our servicemen and other citizens while they were held
as prisoners in foreign lands." 129 The general proposition is commonly
accepted and proper for consideration at the trial; the illustrative
material is sufficiently well known that no serious threat of jury con-
fusion is presented.
Frequent use is made of facts of recent historical importance in
predisposing the jury to one decision rather than another by way of
emphasizing the social significance of a conviction or an acquittal. Most
commonly the prosecuting attorney seeks to combat jury nullification
of prosecutions caused by sympathy for the defendant or dislike of the
severity of the penalty."8 ° This may be accomplished by discussing the
beneficial results of other convictions,"2 outlining the present evils
which conviction would help to deter," 2 or by projecting the probable
evils which would follow an acquittal. 3 All of these, it should be noted,
may be cast in the convenient and familiar form of illustrations of a
general proposition. It is but an illustration of the evils of the crime
when, in a prosecution for selling whiskey, the prosecutor states that
"They are selling whiskey to the soldiers here . . . and this stuff
makes them unsatisfactory for service for days. It encourages syphilis,
venereal diseases and prostitution, and we want to stamp it out." 134
However, argument based on current events and cast in the form of
illustration is not necessarily proper. First, it becomes important to
discriminate between current happenings which are common knowledge
and those which are not. That the Kefauver investigation has held
hearings in a particular city may be well known; what was said at those
hearings may not be.'35 That the dollar has decreased in purchasing
power is an accepted fact; 136 that it has descended to the value of thirty-
129. Id. at 38, 276 P.2d at 199.
130. See Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: II, 37 CoLum.
L. REv. 1261, 1265 (1937).
131. Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 528, 13 S.W.2d 521 (1929).
132. People v. Ridgeway, 89 Cal. App. 615, 265 Pac. 349 (1928) ; Heyl v. State,
109 Ind. 589, 10 N.E. 916 (1887) ; Finley v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 507, 169 S.W.2d
975 (1943) ; Perez v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 575, 150 S.W.2d 402 (1941).
133. Dennis v. State, 139 Ala. 109, 35 So. 651 (1903); Adams v. Commonwealth,
263 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1953).
134. Finley v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 507, 509, 169 S.W.2d 975, 976 (1943). The
argument was held improper and the case reversed, however, because of the prejudicial
effect upon the defendant of this argument during wartime. See text at notes 138-40
infra.
135. Cf. State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 98 A.2d 295 (1953).
136. United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Littlejohn, 279 Fed. 223 (9th Cir.
1922).
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nine cents in a particular location at the time of the trial may not be.137
In general, the more detailed the proposition, the less likely it is to meet
the common-knowledge requirement. But clearing this hurdle, coun-
sel's argument must still' be tested by other requirements. Precisely
because current events are likely to have. so great an impact on the,
jury,' the other, well-recognized limitations on argument are strin-
gently enforced.'39 Most apparent is the risk of prejudice to an accused
when the prosecutor is seeking to convince. To suggest that acquittal
of a policeman being tried for- assault would result in brutality in
criminal administration would be permissible argument. However,
for the prosecutor in the same case to refer to Russian police methods
has been sufficient basis for a court, sensitive to the background of
heated international conflict, to find prejudice sufficient for reversal.' °
Where the use is clearly non-illustrative, familiar risks appear.
When a police chief is on trial for malfeasance in office, the prosecutor
should not be permitted to "testify" in summation by telling the jury
that "You yourselves know that in the past year there has been more
crime, more murders, more holdups, more robbery perpetrated in this
city than at any time in its history. You cannot take up a paper in the
morning without seeing from one to five burglaries and holdups and
murders and where they hang out." '41 The jurors may know what is
137. Todd v. Kansas City R.R., 237 S.W. 868 (K.C., Mo. Ct. App. 1922). But cf.
Brown-Miller Co. v. Howell, 79 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1955) *(permissible to argue that
the dollar has decreased in value by one-third).
138. In a number of cases the events are of personal concern to the jurors or, at
least, related to their daily living. In others the matters have the appeal of the familiar.
139. See Effron-Kushner & Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 195 Iowa 1168, 193
N.W. 539 (1923) ; Finley v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 507, 169 S.W.2d 975 (1943) ; Perez
v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 575, 150 S.W.2d 402 (1941).
140. Adams v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1953). Here the prosecutor,
in referring to defendant's alleged attack, said: "My God, you hear of those things,
and hear of things like that happening in Russia, where they handcuff people and shoot
them in the back." This was held improper. If the tie-in to defendant's action had been
less direct, by referring to the Russian methods as an evil which acquittal would in-
vite, a somewhat different balance might be involved.
A number of cases present variations on the prejudice theme. Some involve preju-
dice which would result from irrelevant use of the proposition being argued. In Morse
v. Phillips, 157 Miss. 452, 128 So. 336 (1930), an action for assault and battery, coun-
sel's attempt to argue that county inhabitants had already rendered a verdict by elect-
ing defendant justice of the peace was held improper.
In Effron-Kushner & Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 195 Iowa 1168, 193 N.W.
539 (1923), plaintiff was seeking recovery for furs not delivered by a common carrier.
Admitting that it was possible that the furs had been delivered to the local station,
plaintiff's attorney maintained that ". . . they were never delivered from the station
to the plaintiff's place of business. They were probably stolen. You have all read in
the papers that three drivers of the defendant have been arrested for stealing express
packages." Id. at 1171, 193 N.W. at 541. A strong argument can be made that counsel
should be allowed to dramatize in this manner the possibility that drivers stole the
goods entrusted to the carrier. On the other hand, the risk of the jury inferring guilt
from the fact of arrest, and a recent arrest at that, is patent. The court held the
argument improper but did not reverse because the judge's charge to the jury had
cured the error. See also Kelley v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 281, 216 S.W. 188 (1919).
141. State v. Peirce, 178 Iowa 417, 440-41, 159 N.W. 1050, 1059-60 (1916).
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in their morning papers, they almost certainly do not know the past
history of crime "at any time" in the history of the city, and they are
unlikely to know what factors other than the activity of the police
chief may be held responsible. In any event, the proposition which
counsel offered in argument is of such central importance to the litiga-
tion that nothing but testimony subject to cross-examination will
suffice. The situation is precisely analogous to use of Biblical material.
A classic source of illustration," scriptural reference has been held
improper when counsel urged the jury to base life expectancy for
damages on the Biblical estimate of three score years and ten.'43
The use of current events, no less than historical fact, is a valuable
source of material for argument. The propriety of such use is beyond
question in a vast range of cases. No doubt current events can be used
improperly. An analysis of the factors involved in the various situa-
tions is necessary; this analysis is not furthered by a blanket condemna-
tion of "every excursion outside the evidence." '
ARGUING SCIENTIFIC FACTS
If scripture can be cited to devil's purpose, that which passes in
the name of science should not be expected to prove less flexible. A
veritable plethora of scientific "facts" are urged upon courts and juries,
and if some be of doubtful accuracy, others are not; they are patently
false. Attorney for the defense in a rape case urged that the testimony
of the prosecutrix was untrue "and not to be credited, because, although
she had testified that her first intercourse with defendant was against
her will, and had been accomplished by force, yet she had conceived.
In other words," said the court, "he was assuming as a scientific fact
1)145that if the woman conceived then there was no rape.. , .
Rejecting the contention as an "exploded theory" without "scientific
support in medical jurisprudence," the opinion observes that "It is now
conceded that the organs of conception, like those of digestion, perform
their appropriate functions without the volition of the female." 146
142. See text at note 56 supra.
143. Alpine Tel. Corp. v. McCall, 195 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Mis-
souri, K. & T.R.R. v. O'Hare, 39 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
144. The language is from State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 119, 98 A.2d 299, 309
(1953). In this case the argument, although improper, was not held to constitute re-
versible error. It is a common phenomenon, however, for courts to dispense with con-
sideration of the propriety of argument merely by finding that the facts stated by
counsel have no evidentiary support. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 281, 216
S.W. 188 (1919) ; cf. Grissom v. Dahart Ice Cream Co., 34 Ala. App. 282, 40 So. 2d
333 (1949) ; State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676 (1923).
145. State v. Lingle, 128 Mo. 528, 540, 31 S.W. 20, 23 (1895).
146. Id. at 541, 31 S.W. at 23.
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Instances can be multiplied, from the changing color of ink 147 to
the statistical incidence of syphilis. 48 Even where inaccuracy is not
patent, the argument is rendered improper where truth of the proposi-
tion being urged is essential to the reasoning and such truth cannot be
established as a matter of common knowledge or judicial notice. These
cases are analogous to a host of others in which counsel base their
arguments on propositions of doubtful validity.'49 It is not for the
advocate in summation to assert or assume, without support in the
evidence, the practice of obstetricians, or gynecologists with respect to
having nurses present at all examinations 15o or the relative difficulty
of expert detection of "two-handed forgery." 151 Sometimes a general
proposition of doubtful validity will be implied rather than made
express. This will not avail if the point of the argument is to establish
an invalid generalization. Thus in a relatively recent North Dakota
case 152 great stress was laid upon the fact that plaintiff's witnesses
were subpoenaed while those of the defendant were not. Counsel
characterized those who had testified for his client as "subpoenaed
witnesses" and observed, "We can't sandpaper those witnesses." 153
Finding no basis for the proposition that subpoenaed witnesses are
any more credible than others, the court held the argument improper.
A somewhat more complex problem is presented by Chellis Realty
Co. v. Boston & M.R.R.,8 4 which involves familiar risks in a new
context. The issue in that case concerned the ability of an engineer to
stop his engine before hitting plaintiff's truck. Counsel argued: "Now,
gentlemen, there cannot be a man on this jury but what knows of his
own knowledge and good common sense that a man can stop a loco-
motive in going thirty rods, if he tries to." ' Adding an example of
a train with a string of cars coming into a station, he invoked the
147. See Sommers v. Weilbacher, 99 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
148. See American Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 70 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
149. See, e.g., Irwin v. State, 16 Ala. App. 109, 75 So. 701 (1917) (improper for
prosecutor to suggest that an Indian's appetite for liquor is even larger than a Ne-
gro's) ; State v. Pavlovich, 245 Minn. 78, 71 N.W.2d 173 (1955) (in a prosecution for
sale of beer with more than 3.2% alcohol, improper for prosecutor to set up an equiv-
alent table for other alcoholic beverages based on 6% beer, because alcoholic percent-
age in beer varies between the two); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 490, 25 S.E.2d
249 (1943) (improper for counsel to argue in prosecution for rape that men and
women are more passionate when under the influence of alcohol).
150. State v. Kassabian, 69 Nev. 146, 243 P.2d 264 (1952).
151. Contra, People v. Carter, 116 Cal. App. 2d 533, 253 P.2d 1016 (1953). Al-
though the court permitted the prosecutor to explain his failure to call a handwriting
expert, the decision seems highly questionable. Search of a standard text, BAXER, Dis-
PUTD AND FORGSD DOCUMENTS (1955), fails to disclose any mention of such a tech-
nique.
152. Hoffer v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 49 N.W.2d 282 (1951).
153. Id. at 299, 49 N.W.2d at 294.
154. 79 N.H. 231, 106 Atl. 742 (1919).
155. Id. at 233, 106 Atl. at 744.
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experience of the jurors to establish that "it don't take 30 rods" to
stop a locomotive. It does not require highly sophisticated analysis to
recognize the dangers in this type of situation. Speed of the train,
condition of the track, the grade of the roadbed are a few of the factors
which will govern. The issue is one crucial to plaintiff's case. His
theory requires a finding with respect to a particular locomotive under
particular circumstances, a finding which cannot be supported by the
generalities of a broad proposition. 15 6 The details of the circumstances
are matters appropriate to the examination of an expert, and it would
be an unhappy choice to allow the supposed experience of the jury to
supplant the need for testimony which might, by proper cross-examina-
tion, be placed in perspective, refined and delimited. The court held
the argument reversible error, neatly pointing out that counsel himself
had recognized the necessity for proof and had relied upon argument
only after failing in the attempt to produce admissible testimony. The
rationale of the court, however, is of interest. The common knowledge
requirement, it asserts, quoting Wigmore, is strictly limited "to a few
matters of elemental experience in human nature, commercial affairs,
and everyday life." 157 The distance in which a locomotive can be
brought to a stop is not one of these.
Similar language is found in the report of an action for damages
said to have resulted from a fire caused by defendant railroad's engine.
In that case counsel for the defense was prevented from arguing that
"It is a matter of common knowledge that electric locomotives are best
and safest for preventing fires." 158 Once again the form of argument
made no difference. Assertions prefixed with a common-knowledge
formula are not thereby immunized from attack. "However well known
this may be to some, it is not apparent that the common knowledge of
the public has progressed as far as this. . . ." More cogent is the
court's remark that "if certainly true it can be certainly proved." 159
Facts which would be so central to the case as these should either be
readily known to be true and applicable 16o or they should be established
by means of formal proof. If the assertion is in fact indisputably true
so that judicial notice is appropriate, it ill-behooves counsel to remain
silent through the trial, waiting for the course of his remarks to the
jury to achieve such notice by indirection. The administration of this
156. It is conceivable, but highly unlikely, that a proposition such as this will be
so clear, even as applied to the facts of a particular case, as to be appropriate for
judicial notice. See text at note 216 infra.
157. 79 N.H. at 233, 106 Atl. at 744.
158. Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Fentress, 127 Va. 87, 94, 102 S.E. 588, 590 (1920).
159. Ibid.
160. Levlon v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 117 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
(permissible to argue that automobiles cannot be started with the ignition off).
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area of judicial notice, which governs facts not necessarily widely known
but nonetheless verifiable beyond contest, is properly for the court;
and opportunity for adequate consideration, to say nothing of notice to
the opposing party, must be afforded.' 6 '
In Aid of Judging Credibility
Probably the greatest potential for use of scientific facts in argu-
ment lies in the area of evaluating testimony. Identifications of faces,
of handwriting, of voices are common. The memory of witnesses,
refreshed and supposedly unrefreshed, is frequently a focal point of
litigation. Whether the witness is likely to have perceived accurately is
a pervasive question in civil litigation, a haunting one in criminal
prosecutions. All this says nothing of veracity. There "being no
universal solvent for truth, each court compounds its own with a
mixture of introspection and worldly experience." 162 Thus, it is for
the court to say whether the twitching of a witness' big toe or his repute
for sexual intercourse out of marriage 63 is relevant to credibility. In
the final analysis, however, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and,
having measured the preponderance or examined for the presence of
reasonable doubts, to render a verdict which presupposes adequate
answers to whatever questions of credibility have been raised. The
jury, in discharging this function, is not limited to the evidence in the
case. We do not require a "blankness of their mental tablets" 164 when
they enter the jury box. We would not if we could,'65 and in any
event we cannot, erase the conclusions of prior experience with which
the jurors approach problems of memory or perception. On the con-
161. For contrasting views on the need for notice prior to taking judicial notice,
compare Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUm. L. Rzv. 945, 974-78 (1955), with Morgan,
Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. Riv. 269 (1944). This is not to suggest that in the instant
case Davis would not consider notice necessary. See Davis, supra at 977. But cf. Wil-
son v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. 371, 17 Atl. 1097 (1889) (lower court reversed for failure
to allow counsel to refer in argument to an almanac for the purpose of showing a par-
ticular date to have fallen on a Sunday despite a plea of surprise by opposing counsel).
Wigmore specifically relates permissible argument of counsel to the proper scope of
judicial notice: "Where the matter is one of which no evidence need ever be introduced
because of its notoriety as a subject open to judicial notice . . ., there is obviously no
impropriety in a reference to it in argument." 6 WIGMORZ, EvIDN CE § 1807, at 266 (3d
ed. 1940). See also 1 THompSON, TRIALS § 963, at 813 (2d ed. 1912) : "An exception to
the rule [prohibiting argument of facts not in evidence] has also been admitted where
counsel have inadvertently omitted to introduce in evidence a document essential to his
client's cause, such as an exemplification of the plaintiff's act of incorporation. Here
the question is governed by the rule that the order in which the evidence is presented
is within the discretion of the trial judge, and that the mere fact that evidence is pre-
sented out of its order is not ground of new trial unless prejudice appears."
162. Comment, 32 Micn. L. Rxv. 251 (1933).
163. Ibid.
164. 9 WIGMORU, EvIDXNc § 2570, at 547 (3d ed. 1940).
165. The New York statute, e.g., requires jurors to be "well informed." N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW § 596.
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trary, the court may "instruct them to take in account their knowledge
and experience, common to the community generally, in weighing the
evidence. . . ." 16 But common sense and common knowledge are
limited tools at best, false measures at their worst.117  Our inquiry is
concerned with the extent to which counsel may, by use of scientific data
in argument, strengthen jury assumptions which are correct, blunt the
force of those which are in error, sharpen those which can prove helpful
only if applied with discrimination.
The significance of the role which argument can play is dependent
in great measure on what counsel may tell the jury. It is clearly permis-
sible for counsel to argue that witnesses may be mistaken in estimating
the duration of a crucial episode; he may also in all likelihood suggest
that science has demonstrated that estimates of the time taken by an
occurrence vary widely, for whatever additional impact that may
have. But where the crucial issue concerns a matter of minutes,
may court 1.. or advocate tell the jury that experiment with college
students revealed a range in reported elapsed time from one minute to
fifteen minutes, where the actual occurrence was clocked at one minute
thirty seconds? '
It is one thing to speak generally of the risks in attempting to
identify voices. It is quite another to be allowed to tell the jury that
after a lapse of five months only thirteen per cent of a group of intelli-
gent auditors could correctly identify a voice previously heard." 1 May
counsel argue as an illustration of the risk in lay identification of hand-
writing that only one college professor in seven was able correctly to
segregate his own genuine signature from a group of three forgeries? 172
A number of experiments on recognition of faces reveal a likelihood
of error which may well give pause to a jury charged with evaluating
166. McCoRmIcK, EvmEHcE 691 (1954).
167. "Common sense is frequently wrong.... Our every day experience of the
world comes in crude, unrepresentative chunks, with causal relations hopelessly ob-
scured, and with prejudice, superstition, and self-interest inextricably intertwined in
perception." Bitterman, The Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in L vIx, Evi-
DENCE AND THE BMAVIORAL SCIzNCs A-16 (mimeo. 1956).
168. See discussion in text at P. 182 infra.
169. That both bench and bar may be bound by the same rule as regards permis-
sible use of extrinsic data, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 522, 164
Atl. 726, 728 (1933) and note 217 infra.
170. See Vickery & Brooks, Time Spaced Reporting of a "Crime" Witnessed by
College Girls, 29 J. CaLm. L., C. & P.S. 371, 374 (1938). See also similar data in 2
MooP.E, FACTS ON THE WEIGHT AND VALUE op EVIDENCE § 871 (1908) ("Sex Differ-
ences in Estimates of Time").
171. McGehee, The Reliability of the Identification of the Human Voice, 17 J.
GN. PsYcH. 249, 268 (1937). See also Note, 33 3. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 487 (1943).
172. Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting (An Experiment), 34 ILL.
L. REV. 433, 436 (1939).
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eyewitness identification." What of the intricacies of line-up prac-
tices? If no line-up is used what may defense counsel say about prob-
lems of suggestibility? If a line-up is used how much may he say of
the manner in which the very use of a line-up deters rather than fa-
cilitates accuracy in identification? 174
To appreciate the problems in developing and using scientific data
suitable for argument to the jury some perspective with respect to the
broader picture of interdisciplinary cooperation in this area is needed.
The history of the law's brush with psychology has not been a happy
one. In 1908 Professor Hugo Munsterberg published a little book,
On the Witness Stand, which attempted to demonstrate what the law
should learn from psychology. Its tone may be gathered from the
author's introduction in which, after alleging that educators, physicians,
artists and businessmen had all come to recognize in "Applied Psy-
chology" a source of "help and strength," he asserts: "The lawyer alone
is obdurate." 175 He accused, in addition to the lawyer, both judge and
juryman of a smug certainty that they had no need of experimental
psychology. For the latter discipline there was lavish praise: its
"searchlight" had already been thrown into virtually "every corner of
mental life." 178
Munsterberg was pioneering and, admittedly, propagandizing. If
the time "is ever to come when even the jurist is to show some conces-
sion to the spirit of modern psychology," he wrote, "public opinion
will have to exert some pressure." 177 And On the Witness Stand was
frankly a means of creating that pressure. The lawyers were not slow
to respond. The more temperate critics were, years later, to refer to
Munsterberg's work as "rash and presumptuous"; 171 the less temperate
spoke of "Yellow Psychology." 179 Probably Hutchins and Slesinger
have not come wide of the mark with their assessment: "The psy-
chologist was too confident, and overshot his mark. The lawyer
snapped back and put the psychologist in his place." "'
173. See, e.g., Belbin & Crane, Some Factors Affecting Response in Recognition
Tests, 8 Q.J. ExPER. PSYCH. 45 (1956) ; Jampolsky, Etude de Quelques Epreuves de
Reconaissance, 49 ANvn PSYCH. 63 (France 1950) ; Stern, The Psychology of Testi-
inwny, 34 J. AB. & Soc. PsycH. 3, 18 (1939).
174. See Designing Experinents for New Developments in Line-Up Law, in
Levin, EViD4NCZ AND THn BnHAViORAL Sc=Ncs B-367a (mimeo. 1956). For the con-
sultants participating in the preparation of this volume see note 20 supra.
175. MiUNSTRBSRG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 10 (1908).
176. Id. at 7.
177. Id. at 11.
178. CAIRNS, LAW AND TH4 SOCIAL SCIZNcMS 169 (1935).
179. Moore, Yellow Psychology, 11 LAW NoTrs 125 (1907). This was a reaction
to a magazine article by Munsterberg. Moore is the author of the two-volume work,
Moonz, FAcTS ON THS WEIGHT AND VALUZ OV EVIDNCE (1908).
180. Hutchins & Slesinger, Legal Psychology, 36 PSYCH. RZv. 13, 14 (1929). One
of the most interesting reactions to Munsterberg came from Wigmore. Wigmore,
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A great deal has happened in the half-century since these debates.
True, the immediate aftermath included a reaction on the part of the
psychologists. The reception accorded Munsterberg "helped to chill
any interest they may have felt in the psychological aspects of the legal
process." 's' Intellectual climate, however, is subject. to change, and
today there is sufficient interest on the part of some psychologists to
warrant discussion of an Institute of Applied Forensic Psychology.
8 2
The total range of potential contributions to the law need not here
be explored. Our concern, focused as it is on argument, is a relatively
narrow one. Whether or not the experimental scientist will produce
findings sufficient to warant changes in doctrine or to offer guideposts
in aid of an enlightened exercise of judicial discretion, it seems clear
that further experimentation may prove helpful in the area of evaluation
of testimony, provided an atmosphere of receptivity for its use is
developed. A jury should be entitled to know whether the witness
who asserts positively that defendant is the culprit is any more to be
believed than one who couches his testimony in terms of "my impres-
sion is that it looked like him." '3 Both judge and jury are entitled
to be told whether bank tellers are any better qualified to identify
handwriting from memory than other laymen, and whether they are any
more proficient than the average juror at comparing specimens when a
standard has been admitted into evidence.'4 Because the answers to
these and similar questions are necessary for the improvement of our
legal system, it will not do to wait passively until science "has some-
thing to offer." 185 It is the law which has the need, and the law which
must feel the obligation to assume the initiative.88  While much is
already available as a result of efforts unrelated to legal problems, the
primary need is for further data, organized and developed with the
requirements of the judicial system in sharp focus.
If experiments are to be designed for direct impact in the trial of
cases, there must be as clear an understanding as possible of the legal
Professor Mieensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report on the
Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 ILl. L. REv. 399 (1909). As Cairns summed it
up: "He [Wigmore] concluded that psychology at that time at any rate, had nothing
to offer; when it did, he asserted, the law would welcome it" CAIRNs, op. cit. supra
note 178, at 169.
181. Ibid.
182. LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES B-401 (mimeo. 1956).
183. State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 575-76, 146 S.E. 395, 402 (1929), in affirm-
ing conviction for second degree murder the court stated: "This kind of evidence has
frequently been held to be admissible in this jurisdiction."
184. See Note, Authentication of Disputed Writings by Comparison: The Expert
Witiess, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 664, 668-69 (1956).
185. Moore, Yellow Psychology, 11 LAW NoTEs 125 (1907).
186. Compare the imaginative statement in 3 WIGmeoRu, EVlDSNCZ § 997 (3d ed.
1940) on data which "conceivably could be obtained" by new methods of the "'psychom-
etrist," with his discussion of methods actually available, 3 id. §§ 998-99a.
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uses to which particular data might be put. Reference in argument, or
in comment on the evidence by the judge, is an obvious possibility which
merits consideration. Such consideration should begin with an ex-
ploration of the legal limits of argument, not in the narrow context of
what science has already made available; but in the broader one of a
clearly discernible potential. The controlling rules should be framed
to facilitate the use of whatever may prove helpful in experimentation
already completed and in that which remains to be done.
This is not to argue for open sluice-gates, inviting an inun-
dation of references to psychological experiments. There are risks."87
Some experiments are invalid because they neglect factors present
in the litigation situation. 88 Some carefully designed experiments
which evidence thoughtful consultation with respect to both legal
and scientific aspects have not utilized a sufficiently broad statistical
sample. Inbau's difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of handwriting
experts willing to subject their skill to testing is an example in point. 89
That his data on the proficiency of experts are based on only three
subjects represents more than a problem in the size of his sample; it
raises doubts concerning its representative quality, for we may "hazard
the guess that the less qualified an expert thought himself to be, the less
confident in his own judgments, the more reluctant he would be to
subject himself to testing." 190 Nor are the generalizations drawn from
experimental data free of the risk of error, not to mention the dangers
of obsolescence as the scientists explore, explode and refine their
theories.191
There remains for consideration a further risk inherent in the
nature of much of the scientific data which an advocate might want to
bring to bear on issues of credibility. Material of this type will usually
deal with the performance levels of groups of people. The results are
187. See the critical analysis of the scientific evidence in the school segregation
cases by Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 182 (1956), who speaks of "recep-
tivity seasoned with critical judgment."
188. See, e.g., Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formulation of Opinion Based Upon
Legal Evidence, 51 Am. J. PsycHr. 609 (1938). Although the focus of the experiment
was to determine what effect, if any, the order of proof has on the ultimate decision
of a case, there was no attempt to include summation of counsel or any substitute
therefor. Furthermore, it remains to be determined whether "jurors" who have no
responsibility either for the freedom of a defendant or for adjudicating financial re-
sponsibility react differently from those charged with such responsibility. See Note,
Gritiquw and Design: A Proposal, in LviN, EviotNcr AND THi BtHAVIORAL SCIMNCMS
E-28 (mimeo. 1956), for further criticism of the particular experiment.
189. Inbau, supra note 172, at 440 n.11.
190. LxvIN, EvmgNCZ AND THS B HAVIORAL ScngNCs B-332 (mimeo. 1956).
191. See, e.g., criticism of Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law
of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARv. L. Rev. 860 (1928), for reliance upon psychological
assumptions which "either have since been demonstrated of doubtful validity, or
[which], in some instances, were incorrect even at the time they wrote." LxvIN, Evi-
DENOC AND THX BEHAVIORAL ScIENcEs B-315 (mimeo. 1956).
19561
172 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
expressed in terms of statistical conclusions: the average number of
mistakes in identification, for example. Does any use of medians and
means involve too great a danger that the jury will fall prey to "the
deplorable hypnosis of averages," 1"2 refusing to believe that one witness
could remember any better than the average, nor another witness any
worse? That there is much substance to this fear is doubtful. The
witnesses are neither unknowns nor unknowables; they have appeared
before the jury and left impressions, and the advocate in summation will
not ignore their individual differences. It is most revealing, however,
to compare the risk of statistical hypnosis with the alternatives presently
in use. The permissible propositions of common experience, as, e.g., that
economic interest may be a basis for doubting credibility, do not purport
to assert facts about a particular witness. And a roster of propositions
collected from legal sources is little short of amazing: it is very im-
probable that master mariners would be together for two minutes in the
pilot house without speaking; ' it is equally improbable that a well-
educated man would allow a subscribing witness to sign first, and affix
his own signature afterward; 19 no class of evidence is more unreliable
than narration of conversations."' Argument fairly reporting and
applying scientific data which can provide a range of typical experiences
against which to measure particular testimony is certainly to be pre-
ferred to the current practice of asserting what is "commonly known."
If the hucksters in our society are correct in their estimation of
what sells their sponsors' products, vast proportions of our population
are much impressed by what "science" demonstrates. Men in white
coats, spouting ratios and sporting test tubes, have long been considered
valuable assets in shaping consumer decisions. Science, laboratories
and experiments have taken on an aura of the sacrosanct. To the ex-
tent that this is reflected in the thinking of jurors, they are particularly
subject to persuasion by reference to scientific data. Where the risks
of referring to such data are not substantial, as in the case of possible
misuse of averages, there is no reason for concern, but where the dangers
are real, as in the case of the irrelevant or distinguishable experiment,
there is particular reason for adequate safeguards.
192. See Haar, Wayne Tozwrnship: Zoning for Whomu-In Brief Reply, 67 HARv.
L. REv. 986, 990 (1954).
193. 1 MOORE, FAcTs ON THE WEIGHT AND VALux oF EvIDENcE § 188 (1908).
While the author's sources here and in the succeeding two notes are legal opinions, the
particular legal use originally made of the statements is secondary to the fact of their
inclusion in a legal treatise devoted to the distillation of legal wisdom about facts.
Cf. the comment by the trial judge in Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933),
after referring to the defendant's wiping his hands while testifying. "It is a rather
curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying." The Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 468.
194. 1 MooR, FAcTs ON THE WEIGHW AND VALr oP EVID NMC § 183 (1908).
195. 2 id. § 871, at 1007; cf. LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
B-315 (mimeo. 1956) (discussing refutation of meaningful material).
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Adequate Safeguards, Practical Techniques and Doctrinal Barriers
The traditional technique for probing relevance and force of
scientific data is cross-examination of an expert witness. It might well
be thought that the next advance in utilizing scientific evidence as an aid
in the evaluation of testimony can come only through the use of such
experts. Perhaps so; one cannot predict history. Practical considera-
tions, however, cast doubt on the advisability of this as a preferred
course. The cost to the litigants is high; ... the time likely to be con-
sumed in the course of trial great. Furthermore, any step conducive
to extending the scope of the already bedeviling battle of the experts is
to be decried. Beyond this lies the huidle of the present state of
authorities. There is precedent for the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence of a scientific nature on questions of credibility. In the celebrated
case of Alger Hiss, for example, psychiatric testimony on the issue of
veracity was permitted. 19 7  McCormick notes that some courts allow
proof by other witnesses to show "defects of mind within the range of
normality, such as slower than average mind or a poorer than usual
memory," 198 although, as might be expected, the authorities are di-
vided. 9 The important thing, however, is that all of these cases deal
with testimony going to the qualifications of an individual witness
whose credibility is directly in issue. The type of material with which
we are dealing does not; 200 it relates only to means and averages, to
statistical samples and ranges within them.
Would it be unreasonable in the usual run of litigation for a court
to refuse to hear testimony about that fictional creature of statistical
expression, the average man? The question of admissibility resolves
itself to the balancing of familiar ingredients: the extent to which the
proffered proof will advance the inquiry versus possible jury confusion,
time consumption and companion risks. Not the least important factor
is the availability of an alternative method of bringing before the jury,
196. See consideration of this problem in Jones, Admission of Psychiatric Testi-
ntony in Alger Hiss Trial, 11 ALA. LAw. 212 (1950).
197. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), 30 NEB. L. REv. 513
(1951); 59 YALm L.J. 1324.
198. McCoRmicK, EVIDXNC4 97 (1954).
199. Ibid.
200. Experimentation directed to the perception of a particular witness, e.g., Brooks
v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 265 (1943) (ability to recognize Negroes), or to the facts
of a particular case involve the familiar question of similarity of condition. Thus the
Missouri Supreme Court has solemnly asserted that a tin can filled with tomatoes was
dissimilar from a human skull. State v. Allison, 330 Mo. 773, 51 S.W.2d 51 (1932).
Counsel in that case was attempting to establish a brain-splatter pattern to show im-
possibility of suicide. Also tried as targets were cotton pasted on cardboard and a
"dressed, picked chicken." See section on Ad Hoc Experimentation, in LlN, Evi-
mnNc AND THE BZ AVIORAL SCIICENs B-401 (mimeo. 1956). Compare the situation
when counsel asks jurors, in the course of argument, whether they can remember the
color of their own ties, the color suit counsel was wearing on a previous day, etc.
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in adequate manner, the general background of probable strength and
weakness of the evidence to which the scientific data relates. Some
advantages of allowing argument by counsel to serve that method have
already been suggested. It is obviously less time consuming and less
costly. But another aspect of testimony may militate against use of
the expert witness. Examination invites cross-examination with its
potential mass of obfuscating detail and a likely emphasis on the range
of possibilities not excluded by research rather than on the probabilities
which have been established. Tactical considerations alone 20 could
thus deter the advocate from calling an expert, even though he might
welcome the opportunity of presenting scientific data in argument.
Furthermore, in terms of helping a jury, the primary need is for a
distillation of conclusions, with just enough figures and detail to lend
meaning and carry force. If we can provide a method for assuring
minimal accuracy and fairness, presentation by the advocate would
appear more efficient and more desirable than introduction into evi-
dence. The doctrinal barriers and the techniques for safeguarding fair
reporting and relevant use remain to be explored.
The most fruitful approach to the doctrinal question is to consider
the admissibility of scientific data in evidence, but without resort to
expert witnesses. Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and approved by the American Bar Association, it would be possible
to read into evidence the data and conclusions of appropriate experi-
ments. Rule 63(31) lists learned treatises as an exception to the
hearsay rule and provides for the admissibility of "a published treatise,
periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art to prove
the truth of a matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or
a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is a reliable authority on the subject." 22 This rule is still
subject to the objection of relevance, and more particularly to the
discretion of the judge under rule 45 to exclude admissible evidence.
The risk of undue consumption of time, the "danger of undue prejudice
or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury" or of unfairly and
harmfully surprising a party who "has not had reasonable opportunity
to anticipate that such evidence would be offered" are all bases for
exclusion. 0" Admissibility under the learned treatise exception, which
has been specifically recommended for adoption by the Committee on
201. This is not to suggest that such considerations will always deter counsel.
Obviously, the decision must result from a balancing of these factors against possible
advantage.
202. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(31).
203. Id. rule 45.
PERSUADING THE JURY
the Revision of the Law of Evidence of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey,2°4 would clearly allow for subsequent argument. But admissibil-
ity is hardly to be desired for its own sake. The strategic advantage
gained from a mass of statistics is, at the least, subject to doubt, and the
legitimate value to a jury may be diminished rather than enhanced by
excessive detail.'
The Uniform Rules suggest the possibility of a practical solution,
broad in its basic terms, yet controlled by the court in a manner to
prevent abuse. Counsel should be allowed to refer in argument to
whatever scientific data or conclusions the learned-treatise exception
would have permitted him to introduce into evidence.00 He should
be allowed to do so without going through the formality of actually
reading the material into the record. Furthermore, since such material
can be considered as no more than a needed supplement to the limited
common knowledge which a juror brings to bear on the hearing of testi-
mony, the rule should obtain even in jurisdictions which may hesitate
to adopt the learned-treatise exception as it applies in the normal case
of medical books dealing with particular injuries or mental deficiencies,
the legal effects of which are being litigated.
This does not open the doors of argument to citation of and
quotation from every allegedly scientific writing which has found it-
self a printer. Two conditions must be imposed, for -they are inherent
in the requirement that the material must have been of a quality and
force to qualify under the learned-treatise exception. First, the data
must have been presented "by a reliable authority on the subject." "
Second, its relevance to the case at hand must be such that presentation
of the data in argument will advance the inquiry rather than detract
or distract, within the broad principles of judicial discretion already
referred to.2"'
204. COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE OF THE SUPREME
COURT Op Nzw JEmssy, REPORT 166 (1955). In a report dated November 1956 the New
Jersey Legislature's Commission To Study the Improvement of the Law of Evidence
concluded that adoption of this rule would be unwise, arguing "that to permit the
reading or submission of such material to the jury would import excessive weight
without suitable control. Only a few states accept this exception to the hearsay rule."
ComrmIssION To STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, REPORT 67
(1956). The controls which may be made available with respect to argument are con-
sidered in text at notes 207-14 infra.
205. It might be urged that reading the text rather than referring to it would
minimize the risk of unfair presentation. This may be doubted so long as counsel may
read excerpts. More significantly, the technical material is usually too difficult to be
of value.
206. See note 125 supra, for discussion of older cases which permitted use of
learned treatises in argument.
207. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(31).
208. See text at note 203 supra.
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Administration of these requirements need not be a formidable
task. Goldmann, J., in a careful, scholarly canvas of the advantages
and the risks inherent in admitting learned treatises into evidence, sug-
gests that ". . . it would generally be the better practice that there be
some notice to the adversary.. ,, 209 Such prior notification, in-
cluding the basic sources and a rather detailed statement of the terms
of reference, would allow for prior determination of propriety by the
court with adequate opportunity for hearing the views of opposing
counsel. Frequently, of course, such hearing will not be necessary.
With surprise eliminated, the opportunity for counter-argument may
satisfy counsel as being adequate under the circumstances. Even if
a hearing is necessary, there may be no need for the presence of an
expert. It is for the judge to satisfy himself as to propriety, and the
unequivocal view of friends of the court from academic circles may
suffice, particularly in the absence of proffered contradiction. 10 For
example, it should not be hard to find agreement on the fact that ex-
periments on learning and remembering nonsense syllables are too
wide of the mark to be cited helpfully on the issue of remembering
conversations."' Written statements, analogous to the affidavits used
in summary judgment proceedings, will sometimes be appropriate. In
many situations, however, particularly in the early phases of developing
permissible references from scientific data, it may be necessary to have
a psychologist or statistician available for questioning by the judge.
The contrast between such a proceeding in chambers for the benefit
of the court and that in the courtroom for the benefit of the jury is
obvious. Less obvious, but often more significant in terms of cost
and travail, is the fact that scheduling an expert's appearance in the
course of a trial can be a difficult tsk compared to setting a fixed time
in chambers, before or after the normal trial day. Bedeviling problems
of adjustment to detail will remain; it would be vain to attempt con-
sideration of all of them at this juncture.
What is most important is the fact that patterns are soon likely
to emerge which, once established, will set the standard for a large
209. Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 320, 117 A.2d 284, 298 (1955), aff'd on
narrower grounds than reasoning of the intermediate appellate court would require,
21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956).
210. In this context it is helpful to compare the limitations imposed on the judge
in making preliminary determinations of fact for the purpose of ruling on admissibility
of evidence. Wigmore says flatly that "In preliminary rulings by a judge on the
admissibility of evidence, the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply." 5 WIGOmO,
EVIDENCE § 1385, at 79 (3d ed. 1940). McCormick, although agreeing that "sound sense"
supports Wigmore's position, finds the American authorities "scattered and inconclusive."
McCol icK, EVIDENCE 123-24 n.8 (1954). The subject is explored in Maguire &
Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 YALIz
L.J. 1101 (1927).
211. See LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND TnE BEHAviORAL SCIENCES B-315 (mimeo. 1956).
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number of cases without either the necessity for or the desirability of
frequent review by the court, or a constant parade of expert witnesses.
For example, the permissible references to errors in observation or in
identification suitable for a criminal case, once ruled upon by a given
court after careful consideration by the office of the district attorney
and the active members of the bar specializing in criminal work, would
be expected to serve with-relative stability." Precisely because of
this it may not be unreasonable to hope for the active participation of
suitable instrumentalities of the organized bar in developing appropri-
ate standards and formulas. Much also depends on the calibre and
quantity of material produced by intensive research in the field of
applied forensic psychology. A roster of generalizations acceptable
and widely accepted for use in court may be developed. Statistics on
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis 21s are a possibility. Verified
data on the ability of bank tellers to recognize handwriting could be
helpful and relatively easy to apply. Even today there is convincing
data of the phenomenon psychologists call "reminiscence," involving
more effective recollection of material sometime after the event as
compared with less effective recollection immediately after learning.214
Depending on the type of material learned, the length of time in which
"reminiscence" can be observed varies, but with the memorization of
a poem it can operate for some days,215 a phenomenon which may have
an impact in appropriate cases. Should counsel consider the litigation
and the testimony important enough to warrant argument along these
lines, satisfying a judge as to propriety should not prove an insurmount-
able obstacle.
Reliability of the material which counsel would cite can be estab-
lished by judicial notice. This is particularly appropriate where data
have been published in recognized scientific journals and there is no
indication of subsequent refutation. True, there has been language in
the cases calling for a more limited view of judicial notice where prob-
212. This is not to suggest no need for discrimination between fact situations even
in the case of eyewitness identification. Experimentation may show the need for separate
evaluation of the testimony of (1) a victim, (2) a bystander-observer of the crime
who is conscious of it and (3) a third party who, at the time of his observation, was
unaware of the commission of any crime, as in the case of a third party testifying to
defendant's presence near the scene of the event either before or after the occurrence.
213. See, e.g., Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 44 J. AD. & Soc.
PsycH. 272 (1949); Mehlman The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 47 J. An. &
Soc. PsycH. 577 (1952); Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis:
A New Look, 52 J. AB. & Soc. PsycH. 262 (1956). These studies may be viewed as
indicating a potential for inquiry; they all leave much to be desired.
214. See discussion in Ltvumr, EvmxcN AND Tmn BHAviORAL ScIzNczs B-315
(mimeo. 1956).
215. Id. B-314c (figure III).
1956]
178 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
lems of jury persuasion are concerned, 216 but this need not serve as,
objection. The jury is not being asked to take judicial notice; this is
an area for determination by the judge. Such notice, it should be
emphasized, indicates a willingness to accept that the experiment has
been done, that the data are accurately reported and that they tend
to show what the author of the work claims by way of conclusion,
usually a carefully guarded statement. The problem of fairness in
context is more complex. Until more data are developed with a view
to forensic use, this aspect may prove difficult. Argument, however,
can be balanced by counter argument, and, where available, ultimate
comment by the court is a further safeguard.
A recent Pennsylvania prosecution for fornication and bastardy
illustrates some of the potential and some of the risks. While the
particular case concerned comment by the judge, Pennsylvania opinions
have asserted that both bench and bar are bound by a common rule as
regards permissible use of extrinsic data.2117  In any event, the risk
being illustrated here is no less 218 than would be true of argument. In
Commonwealth v. Watts 21 for defendant to have been guilty the period
of gestation would have had to be some 310 days, against a normal
282 days. The only expert called was not particularly helpful, testi-
fying to a leeway of some two weeks while both dissent and majority
found agreement that the "medically accepted time possibilities" 221
ranged much farther from the norm. In charging the jury the court
said: "Some of the noted British writers on the subject have spoken
and we think that possibly the best medico-legal data that we have
on it is probably this: '. . . pregnancy has been found to vary from
216. See text at notes 156-58 supra. McCormick suggests that jury knowledge is
limited to the "common knowledge" aspect of judicial notice. "The other grounds,
however, for judicial notice, discussed in succeeding sections [including facts capable
of certain verification], are not the basis for jury-knowledge but are available only for
administration by the judge." McCORAIcK, EvIDnNcg 691 (1954). This objection
would not apply here where the matter is clearly left for control by the court. See note
161 supra.
217. Commonwealth v. Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 164 Atl. 726 (1933), which concerned
comment by the judge, but phrased the rule in terms of both court and counsel. The
rule was thereafter quoted and applied in Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 396-
97, 45 A.2d 43, 45 (1946). See also Quercia v. U. S., 289 U.S. 466 (1933), where the
trial judge commented on defendant's wiping his hands while testifying. The court
reversed, Chief justice Hughes observing that "the trial judge did not analyze the
evidence; he added to it, and he based his instruction upon his own addition." Id. at 471.
218. Of course the impact of comment by the court may be greater than that of
counsel, which would argue more strongly for reversal in the event of impropriety.
219. 179 Pa. Super. 398, 116 A.2d 844, allocator refused, 179 Pa. Super. xxvii
(1955).
220. Id. at 400, 116 A.2d at 844. This is the figure given as normal by the only
expert witness to testify. Various other figures are to be found in the case, including
what the trial court stated to be the average, 270 days. See text at note 222 infra.
221. Id. at 400-01, 116 A.2d at 845 (majority opinion) ; id. at 404, 116 A.2d at 847
(dissenting opinion).
PERSUADING THE JURY
two hundred and twenty to three hundred and thirty days, the average
being about two hundred and seventy days.' "222
Defendant's conviction was affirmed by a divided court. What
is disquieting is the failure of the majority to given any consideration
whatsoever to a central objection of the dissent: that defendant was
entitled, in the context of that trial, to some statement of the proba-
bilities of a birth that long after intercourse. "What are the chances
of a birth being the result of sexual intercourse 312 or more days before
the date of birth?" asks Woodside, J., "Not one chance in a mil-
lion !" 22 Omission of this fact in the course of comment by the judge
should not be condoned. 2 Facilitating use of accurate but mis-
leading data can prove a step backward rather than an advance,
The problem of dissent among eminent authorities, of science di-
vided against itself, is best handled in the context of the rule assuring
fair and helpful use of data. Usually the court will find the wisest
course to be a ruling against use of the material. Certainly the jury
is not competent to choose between the conflicting claims and it is to be
doubted that presentation of both views will often add much beyond
confusion.2" Yet, there is no need for a rule of absolute prohibition;
much depends on the circumstances of the case. A juror relying on
"common knowledge" might conclude that suggestibility in children
is a direct function of age: the younger the child the more suggestible
he is likely to be. Scientific literature indicates that this is not true, for
"suggestibility appears to reach a maximum at around the age of eight
in both males and females." " Certainly this information can prove
222. Id. at 415, 116 A.2d at 852-53 (dissenting opinion).
223. Id. at 403, 116 A.2d at 847 (dissenting opinion).
224. It should be pointed out that the majority opinion viewed the issue of the case
as a simple one on the permissible limits of judicial notice. "The Young case authorized
the court to take judicial notice of accepted medical opinions in respect to duration of
pregnancy, and the court below used the same time span in its charge as that approved
in Coin. v. Young, supra." Id. at 401, 116 A.2d at 845. Rhodes, P..., concurring,
emphasized the same point adding: "However, it should be noted that the court below
merely repeated verbatim what we said in Cont. v. Young.... In my opinion, it was not
error for the trial judge to quote from an applicable decision of this Court, but, even
if it were true, it is not prejudicial error requiring a reversal in this case." Id. at 421,
116 A.2d at 846. Thus neatly posed, one may observe, is the contrast between the
freedom of sources an appellate court may reserve to itself and those it allows to the
court below. The dissent faces this issue squarely. Id. at 411, 417, 116 A.2d at 850-51,
853, emphasizing that the dangers of quotation from a medical treatise ". . .in an
opinion-lower court or appellate-does not involve the dangers involved in quoting
from them to a jury." Id. at 417 n.11, 116 A.2d at 853-54 n.11. We need not here
exhaust the question of the obligation of a court to present data on probabilities when
correctly taking judicial notice of possibilities. Suffice it for our purpose to emphasize
that there is a risk in the presentation of "partial" data, so that the impact is a distorted
one; the Watts case provides an apt instance. Of course, the court should have the aid
of counsel in discovering distortions. In the absence of such aid familiar problems of
failure to object may be presented.
225. Cf. CAIRNS, LAW AND THn SocIAL ScmNcs 218 (1935).
226. WEITZENHOFFER, HYPNOTISm 282 (1953).
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helpful in litigation which turns on the credibility of a five-year-old."
If experimental data were to challenge earlier findings, placing the
age of eight in dispute and suggesting ten or twelve to be more accurate,
it should be for the judge to determine whether the conflict is significant
to the point of rendering the reference in argument of no value or
potentially prejudicial. With no other witness in the disputed age
range, the controversy is not that central to the case: under either view
the jury is aided. A limitless number of variations on the theme of
scientists who differ can be presented. Sometimes a rule of fairness
is better satisfied by presentation of both views rather than by studied
silence concerning each. The court can be relied on to rule with an
eye to the factual context; he need not be bound by supposedly im-
mutable doctrine.
CONCLUSION: A SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE
Fiction, hypothesis and science, in common with the other sources
open to counsel, must be evaluated in terms of a single criterion: im-
pact on the jury. The various sources share the potential of advancing
a legitimate function of argument, that of providing aid in the evalua-
tion of evidence. This function is sometimes served by concretizing
for jurors what they already know in the abstract; it may equally be
served by correcting the misconceptions born of erroneous "common
knowledge" or by filling a vacuum of non-experience, as in the case of
reference to scientific materials. The likelihood of helpful impact is
the justification for making available to counsel material outside the
record. By the same token, inherent in these sources is a common risk,
that of improper impact. In the case of fiction as in the case of personal
experience of counsel, the risk may consist primarily of the possibility
that jurors will impart more into a statement than logic requires or
propriety permits. Variations of this risk occur with every change of
source as well as every change of context. It is precisely these varia-
tions which require a wide discretion in the trial court, allowing scope
for a more careful analysis of the risk-essentials. However narrow
the resulting categories, however limited the precedent value of indi-
vidual cases, the common attribute remains; ultimate evaluation must
turn upon effect on the jury.
If influence on the jury is to be the central factor in determining
propriety of argument, clearly the challenged words themselves must
first be examined. But this alone will not suffice. Argument by an
227. This statement is subject to the absence of other objections earlier considered,
as, e.g., reliability.
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advocate cannot be treated as an isolated phenomenon, insulated from
all other aspects of the trial. Relatively little attention has been paid
to the significance of the order of argument and the extent to which that
order should be considered by the trial court or in appellate review of
challenged persuasion. There is reason to believe, however, that the
impact of a particular statement by counsel may be a function of its
place in the total proceeding. We know, for example, that the relative
order of summation by the advocate and charge by -the court has been
a matter of serious concern to law reformers.228 An occasional opinion
does make reference to the order of argument as a factor in its ruling,
229
although often in an unsatisfying manner. We may seriously doubt
that award of a new trial by the judge is a realistic safeguard against
surprise in final argument.2 0 More appealing is the possibility of a
trial court's allowing an opportunity of reply, 23 although the extent to
which this is done in practice may be questioned. The ultimate in-
fluence of a particular attempt at persuasion may depend on whether
or not it is followed by a judge's comment on the evidence. z 2  We
certainly need to learn more of the influence of summation by the
court,"' but until further studies are completed we may hazard the
228. See VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORic 53 (1955): "In 20
states in charging the jury in civil matters and in 18 states in criminal matters the
charge of the judge to the jury precedes the summation of counsel. Somehow the jury
is expected to remember the trial court's charge after it has been subjected to the
barrage and counter-barrage of oratory from counsel in the case."
229. See People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 834 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ; Wilson
v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. 371, 380, 17 Atl. 1097, 1099 (1889).
230. See Wilson v. Van Leer, supra note 229. The expense of a new trial may be
expected to serve as a substantial deterrent.
231. "This kind of surprise is one of the dangers incident to every contest, and the
only relief against it, is the discretion of the judge, where the new matter or new view
may lead to substantial injustice, and is such as could not reasonably have been foreseen,
to allow an opportunity of reply, or subsequently to grant a new trial." Wilson v. Van
Leer, 127 Pa. 371, 380, 17 Atl. 1097, 1099 (1889).
232. See MORGAN, THs LAW oF EVIDENc-SoMi4 PROPOSALS FOR ITS RErORm 9-21
(1927), for an analysis of the value and the need for permitting the judge to comment
on the evidence. See also Otis, The Judge to the Jury, 6 KAN. CITY L. REV. 3, 7
(1937), quoting Pennsylvania's Chief Justice Gibson in Delaney v. Robinson, 2
Whart. 503, 507 (Pa. 1837): "It is doubtless unpleasant to the advocate to have the
impressions made by an ingenious speech effaced by the mechanical but accurate
process of the judge who follows him, but it is to be remembered that what is lost by
it to the advocate is gained by justice, which is the superior object of protection."
233. Cf. KALVEN, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW SCHOOL (text of speech delivered at Ann Arbor, Michigan, Nov. 5, 1955, on
file in Biddle Law Library), discussing the agreement between jury verdicts and what
judges would have decided: "The percentage of agreement remains almost constant
whether or not written instructions are given to the jury, whether or not the judge
summarizes the evidence, and whether or not the judge comments on credibility or
on the weight of the evidence. These have been highly controversial issues in recent
years, but the data are strongly suggestive of the conclusion that at least in personal
injury cases these procedural controls make the jury neither more nor less like the
judge."
1956]
182 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
guess that many of the risks which have concerned courts in the past
may be minimized by providing for comment by the judge. With that
added safeguard we may properly look forward to an expanded scope
of the sources open to counsel in attempting to persuade.
The trial of cases cannot await discovery of ultimate truth, and
rules of law must be formulated on the basis of available information.
Yet it is clear that we need empirical data concerning the processes of
jury decision if we are to do more than speculate on what influences a
jury. The impact of persuasion by the advocate must be evaluated
scientifically. Fortunately, new experimental techniques for studying
the jury and how it operates are being developed,' 4 and these give
promise of value in the solution of the problems at hand. What is
needed is a four-point practical program for improving the administra-
tion of justice in this area, one suitable for implementation by existing
agencies. Judicial councils, law school institutes, governmental re-
search programs or the instrumentalities of the organized bar " may
prove appropriate, alone or in combination, for particular facets of the
broader undertaking.
First, the empirical study referred to above should be undertaken.
The actual influence of the various types of argument by counsel must
be evaluated with a view to reconsideration and possible reformulation
of the law governing the permissible limits of persuasion. Such studies
may indicate some of our fears too fanciful to warrant crystallization
into doctrine; they may reveal others more substantial than had been
thought. There must also be concern with the wide range of unreported
practices, for we do know that the law in action may be wide of what
it appears from a review of appellate, or even trial court decisions."'
234. Id. passim.
235. See discussion in VANDERBiLT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFoFM 146
(1955).
236. The following statements were made in the course of the prosecutor's sum-
mation in the famous Sacco-Vanzetti trial:
"If my brother wants to know why the Commonwealth did not produce this witness,
that is the answer, because the Commonwealth believes that what Celluci says in that
regard and what Ricci, the foreman, says in that regard is true....
"....And then there is Lola Andrews. I have been in this office, gentlemen, for
now more than 11 years. I cannot recall in that too long service for the Commonwealth
that ever before I have laid eye or given ear to so convincing a witness as Lola
Andrews."
"....Could you understand the attitude of Aunt Julia, the elderly lady, 69 years of
age, with cataracts in her eyes?"
"We did not produce her .... This elderly lady . . . testified that the man was
scrouched down under the automobile and that she could tell it was not Sacco by the
back of his head. Well, I said to you before that the Commonwealth hesitates long
before it puts the stamp of approval of asking condemnation of a man on trial for his
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Information on what judges are doing in fact is a prerequisite to an
adequate understanding of the dimensions of the problem.
Second, a careful inventory should be taken of scientific data
currently available for use by court and counsel. Presentation of such
data should be accompanied with some assessment of the factual and
legal contexts in which use of the material would be appropriate.
Obviously, .an inter-disciplinary effort is required.
Third, there is need for a program which will familiarize both
lawyers and judges with the legitimate role of scientific materials, with
the risks inherent in improper use, and the advantages which may in-
here in proper use. Under our adversary system, it is the attorney
who is expected to bear the primary burden of informing the court
when fresh insights or further information becomes important to
decision. This is no easy burden in the context of the individual case
for the problems concern the fundamental methodology of related
disciplines. The broader program of orientation here suggested would
be helpful. Furthermore, its influence may be expected to extend far
beyond the problems of argument, for scientific evidence is being
offered in increasing measure as relevant to a widening range of sub-
stantive problems."
Fourth, a vigorous program of further experimentation should
be prosecuted in areas where the data can prove helpful to the law.
Some of the resultant findings can be expected to expand the sources
open to counsel in argument.28  It is important, however, that the
process of such expansion should not consist of mere passive waiting
for scientists to provide grist for a judicial mill of review operated
by sceptical judges. Not that scepticism cannot be helpful; in decent
amounts it is not only proper but necessary. This is an area of applied
life upon any witness, and I would not put my stamp of approval upon that kind of
witness." 2 THE SACC0-VANZETTI CAsE 2189-90, 2219, 2220 (transcript 1928).
Witness also the following excerpts from statements made without objection by
defense counsel:
"I say to you as a matter of common knowledge to yourself, it isn't any different
whether you see a person a half hour or whether you see them 10 seconds, if into the
retina of your eye was photographed through that eye to your brain a face, it doesn't
require an hour, it doesn't require 10 minutes. You will retain it if your observation
was sufficient. That woman looked down into that man's face. She told you on the
stand she never could forget that face, that that face wasn't the face of Sacco."
"Identifications! Great Scott I We all know. I know my own brother pretty near
got in trouble. There was a hold up in Boston. A man thought he was Henry McCarthy,
thought he was hi5 cousin. You know it.- Different faces, different man. Identification
of all things is the hardest thing in the world." 2 id at 2153, 2172.
237. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 187.
238. Other results relevant, e.g., to police practices may also be expected. See
note 174 supra.
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science and nothing short of persistent probing, of insistent demand for
demonstrated relevance and reliability, can assure data meaningful for
courtroom use. It is, however, a happier and more efficient process
for the questions to be posed and the doubts to be put at an earlier
stage than decision in the course of trial. Lawyers and judges should
participate in the design of experiments " to assure their validity and
thus to contribute to an improved judicial system.
239. Experimentation designed to help a particular litigant in an important case
is quite consistent with our adversary system. Objectivity and reliability are more
likely to follow from the preparation of data in a disinterested fashion.
